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THE PROBLEM OF RELIGIOUS LEARNING
MARC 0. DEGIROLAMI*
Abstract: The problem of religious learning is that religion-including
the teaching about religion-must be separated from liberal public edu-
cation, but that the two cannot be entirely separated if the aims of liberal
public education are to be realized. It is a problem that has gone largely
unexamined by courts, constitutional scholars, and other legal theorists.
Though the U.S. Supreme Court has offered a few terse statements about
the permissibility of teaching about religion in its Establishment Clause
jurisprudence, and scholars frequently urge policies for or against such
controversial subjects as Intelligent Design or graduation prayers, insuffi-
cient attention has been paid to the nature and depth of the problem it-
self. As a result, discussion about religion's place in public schools often
exhibits a haphazard and under-theorized quality. But in an area so
fraught with constitutional complexity and high emotion, no edifying pol-
icy solutions are likely without a deeper understanding of the relationship
between religious learning and liberal public education. This Article aims
to fill that gap by giving the problem of religious learning its due. It offers
a detailed theoretical account of the relationship between religious learn-
ing and the cultivation of the civic and moral ideals of liberal democra-
cies. It then draws on that account to develop a unique model of religious
learning within liberal learning which takes its cue from the historic pur-
pose of the public school. Since even today it is widely supposed and in-
sisted that public schools still serve a vital role in developing civic and
moral ideals in young people, this Article's comprehensive examination
of the problem of religious learning is both timely and necessary if the
seemingly intractable skirmishes over religion, education policy, and con-
stitutional law are capable of even a modest reconciliation.
* Visiting Assistant Professor and Scholar in Residence, The Catholic University of
America, Columbus School of Law. J.S.D. Candidate, LL.M., Columbia Law School; J.D.,
Boston University School of Law, M.A., Harvard University; B.A., Duke University. I am
deeply indebted to Kent Greenawalt and Philip Hamburger for their guidance. Thanks
also to Mark Barenberg, Vince Blasi, Michael Dorf, Elizabeth Emens, Robert Ferguson,
Paul Horwitz, Mark Lilla, Patricia Seith, Ken Simons, George Smith, Winnifred Sullivan,
and Robert Vischer for valuable comments and discussions, and thanks to the staff of the
Boston College Law Review for their careful and diligent work. This paper benefited greatly
from presentations at The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law, and at
the Associates-in-Law workshop at Columbia Law School.
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Le plus fructueux et naturel exercice de nostre esprit, c'est ti mon gri la con-
ference.'
INTRODUCTION
Religious learning-education about the intellectual, historical,
and ethical influence of religious traditions-presents liberal public
education with a problem. The problem is that religious learning must
be separated from liberal public education, but that the two cannot be
separated if the aims of liberal public education are to be realized.
It is a problem that has gone largely unexamined by constitutional
scholars and other legal theorists. It is true that recommendations for
teaching about religion in public schools abound.2 These views often are
informed by the earnest conviction that good and useful citizens "need
to know" something about religion for more effective living in the
world.3 Likewise, the U.S. Supreme Court has offered a few terse state-
ments in its Establishment Clause jurisprudence which suggest that
teaching about religion may have its civic instrumental uses. 4 Yet insuffi-
cient attention has been paid to the nature and depth of the problem
itself. As a result, discussion about religion's place in public schools of-
ten exhibits a scattered quality, as rival policies untethered to any cogent
or sufficiently developed theoretical frame vie for supremacy5 This
haphazard approach has the unfortunate tendency to flatten the prob-
lem of religious learning, reducing it to subject-specific squabbles over,
for example, the constitutionality of Intelligent Design, 6 the secular
1 MICHEL DE MONTAIGNE, De l'art de conferer, in ESSAIS, LIVRE I1 136, 137 (Garnier-
Flammarion 1969) (1588). "The most fruitful and natural exercise of our minds is, in my
opinion, conversation." MICHEL DE MONTAIGNE, Of the Art of Conversation, in 2 THE ESSAYS
OF MICHEL DE MONTAIGNE 1253, 1254 (George B. Ives trans., Heritage Press 1946) (1925).
2 See, e.g., 2 KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION: ESTABLISHMENT
AND FAIRNESS 122-56 (2008) (listing a variety of approaches and proposals for inclusion
and exclusion of particular policies aimed at teaching about religion); see also WARREN A.
NORD, RELIGION AND AMERICAN EDUCATION: RETHINKING A NATIONAL DILEMMA 249-51
(1995). See generally WARREN A. NORD & CHARLES C. HAYNES, TARING RELIGION SERIOUSLY
ACROSS THE CURRICULUM (1998).
3 See, e.g., STEPHEN PROTHERO, RELIGIOUS LITERACY: WHAT EVERY AMERICAN NEEDS
To KNOW-AND DOESN'T 5-10 (2007); Jay D. Wexler, Preparing for the Clothed Public Square:
Teaching About Religion, Civic Education, and the Constitution, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1159,
1164 (2002); Caroline Elizabeth Branch, Comment, Unexcused Absence: Why Public Schools in
Religiously Plural Society Must Save a Seat for Religion in the Curriculum, 56 EMORY LJ. 1431,
1433 (2007).
4 See infra notes 39-83 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 6-7.
6 See, for example, the animated thrust in David K. DeWolf et al., Intelligent Design Will
Survive Kitzmiller v. Dover, 68 MONT. L. REv. 7 (2007), parried spiritedly in Peter Irons,
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value of Bible reading or graduation prayers,7 and similar hot topics of
the American church/state kulturkampf But in an area so fraught with
controversy, constitutional complexity, and high emotion, no edifying
policy solutions are likely without a deeper understanding of the rela-
tionship between religious learning and liberal public education.
This Article aims to give the problem of religious learning its due
by offering a detailed theoretical account of the relationship between
religious learning and the cultivation of the civic and moral ideals of
liberal democracies.8 It then draws on that account to develop a model
of religious learning within liberal learning that takes its cue from the
historic purpose of the public school.9 Since even today it is widely sup-
posed and insisted that public schools still serve a vital role in develop-
ing liberal ideals in young people, this Article's comprehensive exami-
nation of the problem of religious learning is both timely and necessary
if the seemingly intractable legal skirmishes over religion, constitu-
tional law, and education policy are capable of even a modest recon-
ciliation. 10 It should go without saying that this Article's account of the
problem of religious learning, and the theory of liberal education that
it offers, is entirely consistent with the aim of the Establishment Clause:
Disaster in Dover: The Trials (and Tribulations) of Intelligent Design, 68 MONT. L. REV. 59
(2007), and followed by a predictably offended riposte in David K. DeWolf et al., Rebuttal to
Irons, 68 MONT. L. REV. 89 (2007). The repartee between Professors Francis Beckwith and
Jay Wexler on this question is to like effect. See generally Jay D. Wexler, Intelligent Design and
the First Amendment: A Response, 84 WASH. U. L. REv. 63 (2006) (recounting the details of
the exchange). I do not mean to imply that these debates are unimportant; in fact, this
Article considers the question of Intelligent Design and other curricular issues that impli-
cate Establishment Clause concerns. See infra notes 198-252 and accompanying text. The
point is merely that the theoretical commitments (particularly those that concern liberal
education) that lie beneath these discussions too often remain tacitly simmering beneath
the surface.
7 See, e.g., JOAN DELFATrORE, THE FOURTH R: CONFLICTS OVER RELIGION IN AMERICA'S
PUBLIC SCHOOLS 7-8 (2004) (justifying the contemporary constitutional approach toward
school prayer, for example, as deriving from the changing understanding of religion in
"individualistic," as opposed to "majoritarian" or "collective," terms); Robert Audi, Religion
and Public Education in a Constitutional Democracy, 93 VA. L. REv. 1175, 1177 (2007) (review-
ing KENT GREENAWALT, DOES GOD BELONG IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS? (2005)) (breezily approv-
ing, with no discussion, "nonconfessional readings of the Bible that constitute teaching
about religion or are essential in, for example, a literature class").
I See infra notes 74-82 and accompanying text.
9 See infra notes 84-197 and accompanying text.
10 See infra notes 27, 74-76 and accompanying text; see also GREENAWALT, supra note 2,
at 154; MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, LIBERTY OF CONSCIENCE: IN DEFENSE OF AMERICA'S TRADI-
TION OF RELIGIOUS EQUALITY 233 (2008) ("It is widely agreed today that the mission of the
public schools involves building character and imparting values, especially those essential
for good democratic citizenship.").
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to prevent government promotion of a particular religion or religion
generally."
The problem of religious learning might be fruitfully approached
by considering the following story. Not long ago, there were news re-
ports about Lincoln Hall, a mountain climber who collapsed at 28,500
feet while descending from the summit of Mt. Everest. 12 The day after
he fell, Hall was spied by another climber who stopped and discovered
that, against all odds, Hall had survived the night.'3 He gave Hall hot
tea and oxygen, alerted the base camp, and continued his climb.14 Me-
dia accounts marveled at the improbability of Hall's survival, Everest's
particularly "high death toll," 5 and the rescuing climber's "sacrifice."16
Hall's case was contrasted with that of another stricken climber who was
ignored by approximately forty others who walked right by him on their
way up and down the mountain. 17 There was talk of the "practical case
for callousness" 18 alongside righteous fulminations by none other than
Sir Edmund Hillary, who considered it "horrifying" to refuse assistance
to a dying human being.' 9 "Moral philosophy," one paper quickly con-
cluded, "offers questions but not necessarily answers."20
It has long been thought that American public schools ought to
foster reflection and discussion about just the sort of ethical problems
that these stories pose.21 Indeed, the public school's historic charge
was, perhaps above all else, to cultivate civic and moral character.22
11 See infra notes 39-52 and accompanying text.
12 Alan Cowell, "Dead" Climber's Survival Impugns Mount Everest Ethics, N.Y. TIMES, May
28, 2006, at A10.
1 Id.
14 Bernard Lagan, Alive-The Climber Left for Dead on Everest for 24 Hours, TIMES (Lon-
don), May 27, 2006, at 9.
15 Id.
16 Cowell, supra note 12; Matt Lauer, Dateline NBC: Miracle on Mount Everest (NBC televi-
sion broadcast Sept. 2, 2007), available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/13543799.
17 Editorial, Everest Ethics, TIMES (London), May 27, 2006, at 23.
18 Id. ("Regrettably, rescue at high altitudes is often against the odds."); Binaj Gu-
rubacharya, Everest Climber's Death Sparks a Debate, WASHINGTONPOST.COM, May 26, 2006,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/05/26/AR2006052601637.
html (reporting the comments of climber Lydia Bradey: "If you're going to go to Everest...
I think you have to accept responsibility that you may end up doing something that's not
very ethically nice.... You have to realize that you're in a different world." (first omission in
original)).
19 See Gurubacharya, supra note 18.
20 Editorial, supra note 17.
2 See infra notes 27, 74-82 and accompanying text; see also KENT GREENAWALT, DOES
GOD BELONG IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS? 13-26 (2005).
22 GREENAWALT, supra note 21, at 14, 24-26; STEPHEN MACEDO, DIVERSITY AND Dis-
TRUST: Civic EDUCATION IN A MULTICULTURAL DEMOCRACY 49-50 (2000).
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Early on and for some time thereafter, Protestant beliefs were felt to
be the sole authoritative moral font, to be incorporated wholesale
into the educational program.2 3 For the Public School Society, which
in the 1820s distributed most of New York City's public school funds,
public schools existed to "inculcate the sublime truths of religion and
morality contained in the Holy Scriptures." 24 But by the mid-twentieth
century, the conviction that Protestant Christianity was the exclusive
wellspring of rectitude had quite properly been by and large repudi-
ated, at least by the Supreme Court.2 5 And yet a robust civic and moral
education remained one of the public schools' raisons dtre.26 Justice
RobertJackson's dissent in the Supreme Court's 1947 decision in Ever-
son v. Board of Education, with its insistence on the duty of the public
school to "inculcate all needed temporal knowledge" and "worldly
wisdom," reflected a commitment to the public school's enduring role
as civic and moral tutor.27 Time and again, the Supreme Court has
reaffirmed that role as one of the core functions of public schooling.28
Religious learning, however, now was felt to fall outside the public
school's ken.29 The deliberate "disjunction" between religious and secu-
lar learning that Justice Jackson emphasized in his dissent in Everson,
and which the Supreme Court later implemented, was borne from the
long overdue condemnation of the idea that all students confess a sin-
gle faith.30 But in the process of ridding the public school of coerced
creedalism, something of value was lost to view. Although the public
23 PHILIP HAMBURGER, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE 219-29, 412-19 (2002).
24 Id. at 220.
25 See, e.g., Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 217, 231 (1948)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring) ("This development of the public school as a symbol of our
secular unity was not a sudden achievement nor attained without violent conflict."); Ever-
son v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947). Professor Hamburger observes:
The McCollum case made clear, as the Everson case had not, that the justices
would go far beyond the Protestant version of separation of church and state.
Whereas in Everson Protestants had sought to prevent children in Catholic
schools from receiving state aid for busing, in McCollum an atheist aimed to
prevent mostly Protestant children from receiving released-time religious in-
struction in public schools.
HAMBURGER, supra note 23, at 476-77. The separation of Protestant Christianity from public
education took more definite shape in the Court's later decisions finding school prayer and
mandatory Bible reading unconstitutional. See Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374
U.S. 203, 223 (1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 424 (1962).
26 See GREENAWALT, supra note 21, at 24-26.
27 See 330 U.S. at 24 (Jackson,J., dissenting).
28 See infra notes 74-76 and accompanying text.
29 See GREENAWALT, supra note 2, at 16; NORD, supra note 2, at 63.
30 See 330 U.S. at 23-24 (Jackson,J., dissenting).
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school's "strict and lofty neutrality as to religion" removed the blight of
religious compulsion, it did not have the effect that Justice Jackson had
hoped-that of rendering the student "better fitted to choose his relig-
ion," whatever choice that might mean. 31 What it created, as John Stu-
art Mill had understood nearly a century before, is an educational la-
cuna.32 But far more important, and apart from Mill's concern to
enhance the capacity for autonomous religious choice, the public
school's religious neutrality deprived it of an important mode of hu-
man experience from which to draw in initiating the student into civic
and moral life. These are the fundamental challenges posed by the
problem of religious learning.
In probing the problem, Part I of this Article first considers the
constitutionality of religious learning in public schools and concludes
that the Supreme Court's distinctions between the "secular" and the
"religious," and their respective relationship to civic and moral educa-
tion, are unsatisfying and insufficiendy textured.3 3 Drawing from the
work of the political theorist Michael Oakeshott, Part II clarifies the
conceptual muddle by explaining civic and moral learning in terms of
an ongoing "conversation" -one with both external and internal
modes. 34 It is through these two modes of learning that religious learn-
ing relates to the conversation of civic and moral education. 35 Part I
then tests the modal theory of religious learning in several curricular
contexts with significant constitutional implications. 36 After considering
several objections, 37 Part AT concludes that at a time when more is de-
manded of public schools than perhaps ever before, a public school
that ignores religious learning impairs its capacity to offer its students
an education that is truly liberal. 38
s1 See id. at 24. Indeed, Jackson himself was unsure about the effect of the disjunction
that he proposed: "Whether such a disjunction is possible, and if possible whether it is
wise, are questions I need not try to answer." See id.
32 SeeJOHN STUART MILL, On Liberty, in THE BASIC WRITINGS OFJOHN STUART MILL 1,
111 (Modern Library ed. 2002) (1863) ("[E]xaminations on religion, politics, or other
disputed topics, should not turn on the truth or falsehood of opinions, but on the matter
of fact that such and such an opinion is held, on such grounds, by such authors, or
schools, or churches. Under this system, the rising generation ... would be brought up
either churchmen or dissenters as they now are, the State merely taking care that they
should be instructed churchmen, or instructed dissenters.").
s3 See infra notes 39-83 and accompanying text.
34 See infra notes 84-197 and accompanying text.
3 See infra notes 84-197 and accompanying text.
36 See infra notes 198-252 and accompanying text.
s7 See infra notes 253-314 and accompanying text.
8 See infra notes 315-328 and accompanying text.
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I. RELIGIOUS LEARNING AND THE CONSTITUTION
The Establishment Clause is the obvious benchmark by which to
assess whether religious learning trenches on the Constitution. 39 The
familiar pattern of inquiry focuses on whether the state seeks to privi-
lege a particular religious content.40 Religious learning in public
schools seems to pass that test, as teaching or learning about a belief
system or set of practices need not entail their sponsorship.41 But the
Establishment Clause question reasserts itself in a more interesting way
in those cases requiring that government action have a "secular pur-
pose."42 Secular purpose is the first element of the well known test laid
out in the Court's 1971 decision in Lemon v. Kurtzman,43 but it was first
developed in the Court's pre-Lemon public school decisions in School
District of Abington Township v. Schempp44 and Board of Education v. Allen.45
In Schempp, which struck down mandatory Bible reading and recitation
of the Lord's Prayer as unconstitutional, Justice Clark, writing for the
Court, famously observed that "one's education is not complete with-
out a study of... the history of religion and its.., advancement of civi-
lization" and that the study of the Bible "for its literary and historic
qualities" was permissible.46 The key, in justice Clark's view, is to present
39 See U.S. CONST. amend. I, cl. 1, This is not to say that the Free Exercise Clause is in
no way implicated, see id. cl. 2, only that the question of whether the state may include
religious learning primarily concerns the Establishment Clause. See, e.g., Edwards v. Aguil-
lard, 482 U.S. 578, 596-97 (1986) (holding that a Louisiana law requiring that creationism
be taught in conjunction with evolution violated the Establishment Clause).
40 See GREENAWALT, supra note 2, at 157-93.
41 See GREENAWALT, supra note 21, at 41.
42 See, e.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971); Bd. of Educ. v. Allen, 392
U.S. 236, 243 (1968); Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 225 (1963); see
also Andrew Koppelman, Secular Purpose, 88 VA. L. Rnv. 87, 95 (2002); L. Scott Smith, Con-
stitutional Meanings of "Religion" Past and Present: Explorations in Definition and Theory, 14
TaEmp. POL. & Civ. Rrs. L. REv. 89, 100-02 (2004).
43 403 U.S. at 612.
44 374 U.S. at 225.
45 392 U.S. at 243. Other pre-Lemon public school decisions in which the concept of
secular purpose figured prominently were Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 106 (1968)
(unanimously striking down an Arkansas statute making it a crime to teach evolution in
public schools); Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 216 (1948) ("The
sharp confinement of the public schools to secular education was a recognition of the
need of a democratic society to educate its children, insofar as the State undertook to do
so, in an atmosphere free from pressures in a realm in which pressures are most resisted
and where conflicts are most easily and most bitterly engendered."); and Everson v. Bd. of
Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 8 (1947).
46 374 U.S. at 225.
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the material "objectively as part of a secular program of education." 47 In
its tacit effort to distinguish the "secular" from the "religious," Schelnpp
was emphasizing the purpose of religious teaching.48 A school that re-
quires children to read passages from the Bhagavad Gita or the Book of
Job in order to appreciate their aesthetic qualities and learn about the
historical context in which they were written acts permissibly.49 A school
that requires children to read from those texts to inculcate their sub-
stantive truth does not.50 If that is all that the secular/religious distinc-
tion involves then we have again reached the uncontroversial dichot-
omy of sponsorship,51 one which religious learning, as noted earlier,
can accommodate.5 2
Five years later, in Allen, the Court considered the constitutionality
of a statute that required public school authorities to lend textbooks
free of charge to all students, whether in public or private schools.53
Justice White's majority opinion is a straightforward application of
Schempp's dualistic sponsorship paradigm. 54 In upholding the statute,
47 See id. This represents a more sanguine echo ofJustice Jackson's statement in an ear-
lier case that "I should suppose it is a proper, if not an indispensable, part of preparation
for a worldly life to know the roles that religion and religions have played in the tragic
story of mankind." See McCollum, 333 U.S. at 236 (Jackson,J., concurring). Similar remarks
appear in a few subsequent cases. See, e.g., Aguillard, 482 U.S. at 606-08 (Powell,J., concur-
ring) ("As a matter of history, schoolchildren can and should properly be informed of all
aspects of this Nation's religious heritage .... In fact, since religion permeates our history,
a familiarity with the nature of religious beliefs is necessary to understand many historical
as well as contemporary events.... The [Bible] ... [has] undoubted literary and historic
value apart from its religious content."); Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 42 (1980).
48 See 374 U.S. at 225.
49 See id.
5o See id.
51 To say that the injunction against sponsorship is uncontroversial is not necessarily to
say that the concept of sponsorship is uniformly understood. In a recent conflict in Texas,
for example, where seventh and eighth graders learned at an assembly that Muslims are
"expected to avoid pork" and "dress modestly," that they believe that "Allah is God for all
human beings," and that "Islam" means "peace and submission," irate opponents of the
presentation opined that by discussing the Muslim faith, "school officials were promoting a
particular religion."Jennifer Radcliffe, Controversy Highlights Pitfalls to TeachingFaith, Hous-
TON CHRON., June 9, 2008, at 1. In response to the criticism, Kathy Miller, director of the
Texas Freedom Network, stated, "Clearly this incident and the surrounding debate illus-
trates how explosive the issue of religion in public schools is.... What on earth could be
wrong about educating students about the diverse faith traditions in our society?" Id.
52 See GREENAWALT, supra note 21, at 41 ("Schempp sets the outlines of Establishment
Clause doctrine for public schools. They can neither sponsor devotional religious exercises
nor instruct that religious propositions are true or false, but they may teach about religious
understandings, and they may teach religious texts in the course of secular education.");
Koppelman, supra note 42, at 108.
53 392 U.S. at 238.
54 See id. at 243-45; see also Schempp, 374 U.S. at 225.
[Vol. 49:1213
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Justice White identified the statute's secular purpose as "furtherance of
the educational opportunities available to the young."55 He then distin-
guished "religious books" from "secular books" and held that only the
latter were covered by the statute and that the differences between the
two should be obvious.56 Justice White did not explain precisely what a
"secular textbook" contains that a "religious textbook" does not, or vice
versa.57 After all, under Schempp, a secular textbook could contain reli-
gious doctrines, provided that the school did not sponsor them. 5
8
Justice Douglas perceived this point in his dissent in Allen.59 Build-
ing from Justice Jackson's observation that it is difficult to know "where
the secular ends and the sectarian begins in education, "60 Justice Doug-
las wondered which books should be chosen to teach subjects such as
the Reformation and the Inquisition. 61 Even when particular subjects
are not imbued with religious histories or meanings, they may have
"certain shadings":
The Crusades... may be taught as a Christian undertaking
to "save the Holy Land" from the Moslem Turks... or as ... a
series of wars born out of political and materialistic motives.
Is the slaughter of the Aztecs by Cortes and his entourage
to be lamented for its destruction of a New World culture, or
forgiven because the Spaniards "carried the true Faith" to a
barbaric people ... ?
. .. Is the expansion of communism... a manifestation of
the forces of Evil campaigning against the forces of Good? 62
Stripped of its rhetoric, Justice Douglas's point is sound.63 Textbooks
(particularly those that deal with literature and history, but not only
those) often approach their subject matter with subtle theoretical and
ideological emphases that color the presentation. 64 Since there was no
55 Allen, 392 U.S. at 243.
56 Id. at 245.
57 See id.
58 See 374 U.S. at 225.
59 See 392 U.S. at 260-62 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
60 See id. at 262 (quoting McCollum, 333 U.S. at 237-38 (Jackson,J., concurring)).
61 Id. at 260.
62 Id. at 260-62 (citations omitted).
63 See id.
64 See GREENAWALT, supra note 21, at 175 (describing, for example, a sixth grade
reader containing stories selected "to stimulate imagination, critical understanding, and
tolerance for diversity").
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statutory standard by which to distinguish religious from secular text-
books, Justice Douglas would have held the statute unconstitutional
because parochial schools would inevitably choose textbooks that,
though lacking an official religious imprimatur, contain the "seeds of
creed and dogma."65
The difficulty is that Justice Douglas does not account for the far
reaching implications of his own point.66 The history of the Crusades,
the slaughter of the Aztecs, and the rise of communism all form part of
the history of religion, just as religion forms part of their histories. In
treating these subjects, a textbook or a teacher may cast religion's role
in those histories in favorable or unfavorable hues, but if by "secular"
one intends "unengaged with religion," then a secular textbook merely
offers an artificial intellectual truncation.67 Furthermore, for certain
disciplines-literature, music, and art history are examples-part of the
beauty or ugliness of the subject matter lies precisely in the object of its
treatment. What we respond to in Giotto, Dante, or Bach is in part the
beauty (or horror) of the representation of religion,68 just as the beliefs,
images, and practices of religious traditions inspired these and scores of
other artists. 69 The pain expressed in musical settings of the Stabat Ma-
65 Allen, 392 U.S. at 257 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Justice Douglas's motivation for in-
validating the statute probably stems from his interest in church-state separation rather
than from doubts that he himself would be able to distinguish between religious and secu-
lar textbooks. See id. at 256. Philip Hamburger has documented the remarkably similar
motivations, if not the specific views, of various supporters of compulsory public education
in early twentieth century Oregon: "[A]ny sectarian school ... has a tendency to shape the
plastic mind of the child into a molded path from which there is small chance to escape at
maturity." HAMBURGER, supra note 23, at 418 (quoting A.G. Fries, Letter to the Editor,
Sectarian Schools Rapped. Menace to Nation's Progress .... MORNING OREGONIAN, Nov. 5, 1922,
at 9).
66 SeeAllen, 392 U.S. at 260-62 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
67 1 am not recycling the argument, rejected by Justice Clark in Schempp, that when
textbooks fail to mention religion they establish de facto a "religion of secularism." See 374
U.S. at 225. My claim is that religion is simply part of what is being taught. I take this objec-
tion to the secular purpose requirement to be different in kind than any of the four para-
digm objections to it addressed by Professor Koppelman. See Koppelman, supra note 42, at
113-25.
68 SeeJAROSLAV PELIKAN, THE VINDICATION OF TRADITION 14 (1984) ("An upsurge of
[artistic] interest in some particular saints, for example in Jerome around the time of
Caravaggio, manifests an interaction between art and devotion that is unintelligible with-
out the study of the tradition upon which both art and devotion drew."); see also NORD &
HAYNES, supra note 2, at 120 (stating that "art is a dimension of religion"). It is of course
true that one need not know anything about St. Jerome in order to be moved by Caravag-
gio's painting. But Pelikan's observation gestures toward the subtler point that one's ap-
preciation for Caravaggio's painting is enriched and deepened by an understanding of the
religious tradition that inspired it. See PELIKAN, supra, at 14.
69 See PELIKAN, supra note 68, at 79-80.
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ter-whether that of Palestrina, Vivaldi, Stanford, Poulenc, Gounod, or
so many others-is not the sorrow of a hypothetical everywoman
mother whose hypothetical everyman son was executed. It is the apo-
theosis of that anguish, reflected in art that took itself to be divinely
inspired and that in turn aspired to beau ideal. So the "literary and his-
toric" value in reading the Upanishads, in Schempp's locution, implicates
Justice Douglas's religious shadings in complex and diffuse ways, ex-
tending much further and more subtly than the rather ridiculous ques-
tion of whether the Crusades should be taught as the righteous vindica-
tion of the one true faith. 70 Indeed, the pervasiveness of these shadings
cries out for a more refined methodology than what the Supreme
Court has offered.
At the first, and simplest, level of religious shadings, there is obvi-
ously a clear distinction between religious instruction explicitly in-
tended to sponsor a religious view and religious instruction designed to
enhance students' understanding and engagement with poetry, art-
work, literature, music, and other fields that treat religious themes. 71 To
be sure, religious learning of the latter sort will likely have some effect
on students' impressions of religion. 72 But public schools do not violate
Anyone who supposes that tradition must inhibit creativity need only listen,
one after another, to two or three settings of the Mass, to hear how the com-
poser has been able to find ... a vehicle for an utterly personal and subjective
voice in this eminently public and thoroughly traditional text of the Latin
Mass. So idiosyncratic is each of them that some superficial interpreters have
been tempted to dismiss the common element in all of them, which is the
text of the Mass, as no more than a pretext which allowed the composers to
say what they would have said anyway, since, after all, that text was 'merely
traditional.' But tradition is not so 'mere' as all that, even when the Mass is
composed by Mozart the Catholic Freemason or Bach the orthodox Lutheran
or Beethoven the believer/unbeliever.
Id.
70 See 374 U.S. at 225.
71 See GREENAWALT, supra note 21, at 80.
72 See id. at 85 ("One can certainly imagine [teaching about a variety of religious beliefs)
indirectly leading students to the opinion that no particular religion has a monopoly on
truth or lies at the center of human understanding, that all religions make some extravagant
claims that reasonable, enlightened minds will reject."); see also MARTIN E. MARTY, EDUCA-
TION, RELIGION, AND THE COMMON GOOD: ADVANCING A DISTINCTLY AMERICAN CONVERSA-
TION ABOUT RELIGION'S ROLE IN OUR SHARED LIFE 53 (2000) ("Take students to an art mu-
seum and let them learn to appreciate Buddhist art, under the guidance of a teacher or
docent who may be Buddhist, and they will be richer for it. Exposing students to Buddhist art
will not make them Buddhist.. ").
Developing a child's religious sensibilities in this way may give rise to parental and stu-
dent objections on various grounds. Some of these are discussed infra in the text accom-
panying notes 294-314.
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the Establishment Clause if in teaching about religion they aim to
deepen students' intellectual engagement with these traditions. 3
At the second, and more complex, level of shadings, there is the
question of the relationship between religious learning and the public
school's cultivation of "civic" and "moral" ideals in students. Both the
history of American public schools and several towering Supreme Court
decisions have established that public schools ought to impart civic ide-
als. 74 Though the Court has not specified exactly what those ideals in-
clude, the list probably comprises those that "[go] to the heart of repre-
sentative government," 75 and can be plausibly reduced to, at the least,
the belief in human equality, a respect for and allegiance to freedom,
the uninhibited discussion of ideas, respect and tolerance for others and
their beliefs, and independent, creative, and critical thinking.76
Public schools also have a role in cultivating other ideals that are
not, strictly speaking, political-character traits and beliefs about what
is valuable or worthwhile in life. It is not especially controversial, for
example, that schools should teach children to be honest, respectful of
authority, hardworking, patient, courageous, thoughtful, and caring
toward others, even when those qualities do not bear directly on their
political lives.77 Likewise, schools should convey that knowledge and the
73 See Schempp, 374 U.S. at 225. Of course, nothing in Schempp requires teaching about
religion to meet these ends. See GREENAWALT, supra note 21, at 80.
74 See, e.g., Aguillard, 482 U.S. at 584 (quoting McCollun, 333 U.S. at 231); Bethel Sch.
Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681 (1986); Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 76-77
(1979); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 221 (1972); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483,
493 (1954); Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925). Congress has stressed civic
ideals as well. See, e.g., Goals 2000: Educate America Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-227,
§ 102(3) (a), 108 Stat. 129, 131 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 5812(3)(a) (2000))
("[E]very school in America will ensure that all students learn to use their minds well, so
that they may be prepared for responsible citizenship.. ").
75 See Ambach, 441 U.S. at 75-76 (quoting Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 647
(1973)).
76 See GREENAWALT, supra note 21, at 24; see also WILLIAM GALSTON, LIBERAL PURPOSES:
GOODS, VIRTUES, AND DIVERSITY IN THE LIBERAL STATE 220 (1991) (writing that civic edu-
cation is the teaching of skills and dispositions required in "a community possessing to a
high degree the following features: popular-constitutional government; a diverse society
with a wide range of individual opportunities and choices; a predominantly market econ-
omy; and a substantial, strongly protected sphere of privacy and individual rights");
Stephen Macedo, Constituting Civil Society: School Vouchers, Religious Nonprofit Organizations,
and Liberal Public Values, 75 CHIL-KENT L. Rzv. 417, 423 (2000) (citing MACEDO, supra note
22, at 51-130) (suggesting that the public school fosters and forges a "shared civic cul-
ture").
77 One scholar has observed that the British Education Reform Act of 1988 requires
that schools promote students' "spiritual development ... alongside their moral, cultural,
mental and physical development." Colin Wringe, Is There Spirituality? Can It Be Part of Edu-
cation?, 36J. PHIL. EDUC. 157, 157 (2002). Because it would no doubt be controversial to
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arts are inherently valuable and that students should be intellectually
curious. 78 This obviously incomplete miscellany could be called (for
lack of anything better) "moral ideals."79 The role of public schools in
developing moral ideals has not received the type of explicit support
that the Supreme Court has accorded to civic ideals, if only because
their content has been even less concretely detailed.8° Still, one would
be hard pressed to argue that courts do not view moral ideals as impor-
tant.81 And because moral and civic ideals overlap so often and are not
feasibly separable,82 they are often conceived as part of the general,
normative deposit that public schools are charged to cultivate. The
question then becomes how, if at all, religious learning, whose teaching
in public school has received little or no support, relates to civic and
moral learning.8 3
II. RELIGIOUS LEARNING WITHIN LIBERAL LEARNING
It makes little sense to address that question, however, without first
attending to the question of what it means for public schools to culti-
suggest that "spiritual development" is an educational desideratum in the United States, it
is not included here.
78 See GREENAWALT, supra note 21, at 26; see also Rosemary C. Salomone, Common
Schools, Uncommon Values: Listening to the Voices of Dissent, 14 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 169, 225
(1996).
79 Some question whether aesthetic sensitivity is primarily a "moral value." See e.g., Amy
GUTMANN, DEMocRATnc EDUCATION 51 (1987). Professor Gutmann understands "moral
values" as those which give "cultural coherence" to a child's life. See id. Though I believe that
this view is altogether on the wrong track (for reasons explained below), the admittedly im-
precise phrase "moral ideals" is intended more as a catch-all than as terminologically ideal.
80 See Fraser, 478 U.S. at 681 (explicitly endorsing the teaching of civic ideals).
81 See, e.g., Mozert v. Hawkins County Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 1058, 1071 (6th Cir. 1987)
(Kennedy, J., concurring) (noting that public education's role in teaching students to
think about "social and moral issues" is as important as teaching civic virtues). In Mozert, a
group of parents complained that the use of certain textbooks taught their children "evo-
lution, moral relativism, internationalism (rather than patriotism), witchcraft, and idolatry,
and also 'denigrate[d] the differences between the sexes,' [and] disparage[d] parental
control of children." See George W. Dent, Jr., Religious Children, Secular Schools, 61 S. CAL. L.
REv. 863, 866 (1988); see also Mozert, 827 F.2d at 1062. In challenging the school's curricu-
lar choices, the plaintiffs in Mozert did not distinguish between the "civic" and "moral"
ideals expressed in the textbooks. See Mozert, 827 F.2d at 1062. Many of their objections
pertain to both civic and moral ideals, as those terms are used here. See id.
82 See Amy Gutmann, Civic Education and Social Diversity, 105 ETHics 557, 573 (1995)
("[M]ost (if not all) of the same skills and virtues that are necessary and sufficient for edu-
cating children for citizenship in a liberal democracy are also those that are necessary and
sufficient for educating children to deliberate about their way of life, more generally (and
less politically) speaking.").
83 See infra notes 119-197 and accompanying text.
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vate civic and moral, let alone religious, learning. a4 There are of course
practical limits-of resources, time, expertise, inclination, and so on-
to what any public school can teach.85 But I am more interested here in
exploring the theory of education that should inform civic and moral
learning. That is, by what methodological light should public schools
educate students for civic and moral life? It may seem that this inquiry
is "hopelessly empirical," but it has been suggested that educational
theory has a crucial role to play in understanding what it means to
"have," to teach, and to learn a civic or moral ideal.8 6 Only after that
theoretical work is done will it be possible to consider the role of reli-
gious learning within the larger structure.
A. The Metaphor of Conversation
To cultivate civic and moral ideals is obviously not merely to pro-
vide a list of attributes and personal character traits (the civic and
moral ideals listed earlier, for example) for students to absorb or com-
mit to memory. Students cannot be dragooned into believing that ab-
stract ideals such as honesty or equality are worthwhile by inculcation
or even simple exhortation, as if they were jars to be filled or empty
rooms to be decorated with value-laden furniture. It is also not to en-
gage in an examination of ourselves or others with a narrowly tenden-
tious eye toward distilling the civic and moral ideals from the welter of
the world's histories and traditions, for the purpose of hammering
them home dogmatically. The goal of the school should not be to
reach, by persuasion or debate, the formulaic truth or wisdom of these
ideals or to prove them unassailably.
The metaphor that I propose is a conversation-one that goes on
both publicly and within each student.8 7 The conversation of education
84 See Christopher L. Eisgruber, How Do Liberal Democracies Teach Values?, in MORAL AND
POLITICAL EDUCATION 58, 71 (Nomos No. 43, Stephen Macedo & Yaei Tamir eds., 2002).
85 See infra notes 253-293 and accompanying text (touching upon some of these diffi-
culties).
86 Eisgruber, supra note 84, at 71.
87 The view offered here owes much to Michael Oakeshott's philosophy of education,
though it differs in several important features. I have relied especially on MICHAEL OAKE-
SHOTr, EXPERIENCE AND ITS MODES (1933) and Oakeshott's essays in ON HUMAN CON-
DUCT (1975); RATIONALISM IN POLITICS AND OTHER ESSAYS (Timothy Fuller ed., Liberty
Press 1991) (1962); RELIGION, POLITICS AND THE MORAL LIFE (Timothy Fuller ed., 1993);
and THE VOICE OF LIBERAL LEARNING (Timothy Fuller ed., 1989). Secondary sources on
Oakeshott's work in this area that have proven particularly valuable include ELIZABETH
CAMPBELL COREY, MICHAEL OAKESHOTr ON RELIGION, AESTHETICS, AND POLITICS (2006);
PAUL FRANCO, MICHAEL OAKESHOTr: AN INTRODUCTION (2004); TERRY NARDIN, THE PHI-
LOSOPHY OF MICHAEL OAKESHOTr (2001); EFRAIM PODOKSIK, IN DEFENSE OF MODERNITY:
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is a deliberate initiation of a learner into "an inheritance of human un-
derstandings," of which civic and moral learning forms a vital part.88 It
demands that students learn certain procedural skills-certain habits
and arts of intellectual and social engagement-as well as a body of
substantive knowledge.8 9
The habits of attention and self-expression, the ability to partici-
pate in and submit to immanent criticism,90 "the art of indicating assent
or dissent in graduated terms,'9 1 the awareness of and patience to con-
sider the minute particulars and subtleties of a math problem, a history,
a poem, or an ethical dilemma-all of these and more may be called
"procedural" qualities of the conversation of education whose cultiva-
VISION AND PHILOSOPHY IN MICHAEL OAKESHOT-r (2003); ANDREW SULLIVAN, INTIMA-
TIONS PURSUED: THE VOICE OF PRACTICE IN THE CONVERSATION OF MICHAEL OAKESHOYT
(2008); KEVIN WILLIAMS, EDUCATION AND THE VOICE OF MICHAEL OAKESHOIr (2007)
[hereinafter WILLIAMS, EDUCATION]; Geoffrey Hinchliffe, Education or Pedagogy?, 35 J.
PHIL. EDUC. 31 (2001); Chris Lawn, Adventures of Self-Understanding: Gadame, Oakeshott and
the Question of Education, 27 J. BRIT. SoC'Y FOR PHENOMENOLOGY 267 (1996); David
McCabe, Michael Oakeshott and the Idea of Liberal Education, 26 SOc. THEORY & PRACTICE 443
(2000); and Kevin Williams, The Gift of an Interval: Michael Oakeshott's Idea of a University
Education, 37 BRrr.J. EDUC. STUD. 384 (1989) [hereinafter Williams, The Gift].
8 MICHAEL OAKESHOTr, Education: The Engagement and Its Frustration, in THE VOICE OF
LIBERAL LEARNING, supra note 87, at 63, 75-76.
89 It may be objected that Oakeshott wrote about and was interested in university edu-
cation, not elementary or secondary schooling. It is true that in what has been called
Oakeshott's "middle period" (from about the late 1940s through the mid-1960s), his essays
on education focus primarily on universities. See PODOKSiK, supra note 87, at 212. But his
essays on education of the "late period" (from the late 1960s through the 1970s) deal with
more general concepts of education that are equally applicable to high schools and often
enough to grade schools as well, as he himself sometimes suggested. See id.; see also MI-
CHAEL OAKESHOTr, Learning and Teaching, in THE VOICE OF LIBERAL LEARNING, supra note
87, at 62; MICHAEL OAKESHOTr, The Study of "Politics" in a University, in RATIONALISM IN
POLITICS, supra note 87, at 188-90. Naturally, Oakeshott's interests in education overlap
significantly in these periods.
There also are at least two independent reasons to explore whether Oakeshott's phi-
losophy of education is appealing at the primary and secondary school level. First, it is
possible to criticize Oakeshott's position as elitist and anti-democratic-as a belittlement of
the urgencies of the quotidian and a suggestion that only those who attend universities are
capable of leading truly fulfilling lives. That objection is neutralized if his understanding
of education as a conversation is salient in the elementary and secondary school context.
Second, learning according to the model offered here cannot be simply "turned on"
sometime between year seventeen and eighteen. It is an ongoing endeavor whose success
demands an early initiation and a regular engagement.
90 SeeJEFFREY STOUT, DEMOCRACY AND TRADITION 70-73 (2004). Stout demonstrates
how the capacity to participate in and be subjected to immanent criticism is a crucial com-
ponent of showing respect for other people and their views. See id.
91 MICHAEL OAKESHOT-Y, The Voice of Poetry in the Conversation of Mankind, in RATIONAL-
ISM IN PoLrrIcS, supra note 87, at 488, 491 n.1.
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tion officially begins in the public school.92 Both civic and moral learn-
ing depend on what Oakeshott has called "a habit of affection and be-
havior," an unselfconscious adherence to the customs (or manners, in
the least fussy sense of the term)93 of the educational conversation that
is gained not by self-consciously confessing any civic or moral creed but
by observing and interacting with others who manifest the procedural
virtues habitually.94
But students must also encounter the substantive ideas contributed
by the voices of the past to the conversation of learning-the "expres-
sions of thought, emotion, belief, opinion, approval and disapproval, of
moral and intellectual discriminations, of enquiries and investiga-
tions"95-and be challenged to understand and respond to them. This is
not necessarily a call to emphasize the "Great Books,"96 nor is it merely
an appeal to an instrumental "cultural literacy" or "core knowledge" of
the sort once advocated by E.D. Hirsch.97 The "substantive" component
of the educational conversation operates in tandem with its technical
counterpart and is essentially inseparable from it.98 "Judgment" and "in-
formation" are not communicated or acquired independently.99 To par-
92 "Officially," because education of this sort generally begins much earlier in life.
93 Kevin Williams has criticized Oakeshott's conversational metaphor for demanding
too much politesse on the part of the participants to be a genuine dialogue. See WILLIAMS,
EDUCATION, supra note 87, at 184. Whatever the merit of this criticism with respect to
Oakeshott's work, the conversational model proposed in this Article contemplates the
necessity of critical, if respectful, discursive engagement as a vital component of civic and
moral development.
94 See MICHAEL OAKESHOTr, The Tower of Babel, in RATIONALISM IN POLITICS, supra note
87, at 465, 467. The ability to 'write well," for example, is in large part-though not exclu-
sively-a reflection of one's mastery of the procedural virtues. See Eisgruber, supra note 84,
at 72. Yet those procedural virtues necessarily exist and are exercised within a tradition of
practice. See MICHAEL OAKESHOTT, Rational Conduct, in RATIONALISM IN POLITICS, supra
note 87, at 99, 111 ("'Good' English is not something that exists in advance of how English
is written (that is to say, English literature); and the knowledge that such and such is a
sloppy, ambiguous construction, or is 'bad grammar,' is not something that can be known
independently and in advance of knowing how to write the language.").
95 MICHAEL OAKESHOTr, A Place of Learning, in THE VOICE OF LIBERAL LEARNING, supra
note 87, at 17, 32.
96 It is not the sort of nostalgic and suppositious longing to recapture an unadulter-
ated, "classical" education that one finds in Allan Bloom's famous polemic. See generally
ALLAN BLOOM, THE CLOSING OF THE AMERICAN MIND (1987).
97 See E.D. HIRSCH,JR., CULTURAL LITERACY: WHAT EVERY AMERICAN NEEDS To KNow
12-18 (1987). On the differences among Oakeshott, Bloom, and Hirsch, see FRANCO, su-
pra note 87, at 123-24.
98 See MICHAEL OAKESHOTr, Learning and Teaching, supra note 89, at 58-60.
99 See id. at 59-60 ("[Jludgment may be taught and it belongs to the deliberate enter-
prise of the teacher to teach it. But, although a pupil cannot be explicitly instructed in
how to think (there being, here, no rules), 'judgment' can be taught only in conjunction
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ticipate in the conversation is to harness its procedural and substantive
components into an experiential unity. The public school begins to cul-
tivate civic and moral ideals in its students by facilitating their participa-
tion when the conversation's substantive component turns to the practi-
cal relationships among human beings.' 00 The procedural component
enables reflection on the substantive, just as the substantive enriches
and refines the procedural, creating in the student an intimacy with
civic and moral learning as it has developed in the voices of past tradi-
tions.
The familiar multicultural challenge is lurking. The objection is
that education conceived in this fashion reflects an indefensible bias for
established, "Western" civic and moral traditions. Many have persua-
sively argued that liberal education has in the past focused insufficiently
on the traditions and achievements of persons from non-Western socie-
ties or of historically powerless or oppressed persons within those socie-
ties. A theory of education as a conversation threatens to obscure the
more important question: whose traditions get transmitted? Indeed, it
might seem as if the very idea of a "common" school carries with it the
outdated assumption that there is a common culture about which all
students ought to be educated. 10 1 It is true that the choice of which tra-
dition to transmit cannot itself be made except from within some tradi-
tion of thought with its own criteria (or, perhaps, "prejudices") of
worth. 02 Still, even conceding that no choice can be made from within
a perspectivally chaste cocoon, an educational approach that empha-
sizes openness to development, refinement, and revision is surely in
sympathy with the observation that many existing traditions have been
all too narrowly circumscribed. And mere "diversity" in the curriculum
with the transmission of information."). Andrew Sullivan explains, "Pure judgment is for
Oakeshott not simply undesirable, but meaningless. Judgment and information are both
separate but intrinsic in all practical conduct." SULLIVAN, supra note 87, at 75.
The distinction between judgment and information involves the manner of their re-
spective communication to students "rather than in a dichotomy of what is known." See
OAKESHoTr, Learning and Teaching, supra note 89, at 57. Judgment, as suggested above, is
imparted through an unreflective modeling of behaviors, habits, and dispositions. Infor-
mation, by contrast, is deliberately chosen, organized, and conveyed (by the teacher). See
id.
100 See Eisgruber, supra note 84, at 72-74.
101 See Walter Feinberg, Culture and the Common School, 41 J. PHIL. EDUC. 591, 593
(2007) (pointing out that the "colonialist" conception of "cultural hierarchy has been flat-
tened out").
102 See generally HANs-GEORG GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD 269-71 (Joel Wein-
sheimer & Donald G. Marshall trans., Crossroads, 2d rev. ed. 1989) (discussing the idea of
"prejudice" as a necessary "forestructure" of understanding).
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is an inadequate criterion for choice, chiefly because it vastly underde-
termines what might be chosen. Most importantly, there is an adven-
turous component to education conceived as a conversation-that "one
does not know where it will end because education is not an end prod-
uct"-which is entirely compatible with the multicultural critique.103 It
would be an unfortunate misapprehension to accuse this educational
model of entrenching a blindly uncritical traditionalism, as it holds out
the development of individual, not communal, civic and moral sensibil-
ity as paramount.10 4
B. The Internal and External Modes of the Conversation
The conversation of civic and moral learning is carried on in
both external and internal modes.105 The external mode concerns the
ways in which people address and respond to one another viva voce-
in a public fashion that can be overheard by others.10 6 Schools offer
an ideal structure for the external mode to flourish. They supply a
curriculum that orders students' initiation into the conversation, a
forum for the procedural virtues of the conversation to flourish, and a
103 See Lawn, supra note 87, at 275-76.
104 WILLIAMS, EDUCATION, supra note 87, at 171-73.
105 A "mode" is a manner of understanding; the term is used to suggest that worlds of
experience (such as history, natural science, and religion) are understood partially, per-
sonally, and conditionally within a specific framework- "at the point of arrest" and from a
limited perspective. See OAKESHoTr, EXPERIENCE AND ITS MODES, supra note 87, at 73-74.
Nevertheless, there is a tension between this Article's modal theory of learning and
Oakeshott's views. Although Oakeshott mentions a "conversation which goes on both in
public and within each of ourselves," OAKESHOTr, Voice of Poetry, supra note 91, at 490, he
does not elaborate on the specific features and functions of what I have called the "exter-
nal" and "internal" conversational modes, and he does not tie these modes to civic and
moral learning. Oakeshott was firmly opposed to the idea that the purpose of education
was to convey "useful" information or that education ought in any sense to "reflect" the
larger world. See, e.g., OAKESHorYT, Engagement and Frustration, supra note 88, at 98; Mi-
CHAEL OAKESHoTr, The Universities, in THE VOICE OF LIBERAL LEARNING, supra note 87, at
105, 126-27; Williams, The Gift, supra note 87, at 387 ("As with education at its primary and
secondary levels, [for Oakeshott] university education has no function in the sense of hav-
ing a purpose extrinsic to the initiation of students into the conversation of education.").
The account of the external and internal modes offered here takes the different and
more moderate view that civic and moral learning, as it involves the relations among hu-
man beings, is of necessity in some sense practical. Still, there is an important difference
between urging "religious literacy" solely (or even primarily) for its instrumental utility or
for its power to "reflect" the world and its problems, and acknowledging that such utility
may be a byproduct (but should never be the purpose) of an education that takes conver-
sation as its model. See PROTEItO, supra note 3, at 5-10 (offering a contrary view more in
line with Hirsch).
106 This need not be "in public," as in a public park or street. A "private" discussion be-
tween two people alone in a room may reflect the external mode.
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partial physical and psychological detachment from the concerns of
students' immediate worlds. Of particular value for the external
mode, however, schools provide teachers and other students as con-
versation partners. Teachers, all of whom have mastered certain pro-
cedural and substantive elements of the conversation- "in whom
some part or aspect of this inheritance is alive" -represent students'
primary guide to the process of initiation into the world of civic and
moral understandings. 10 7 Students who are undergoing the same ini-
tiation begin to engage one another in interpreting and understand-
ing civic and moral ideals, as presented after the fashion of their
teacher and within the "specific formal relationship between the par-
ticipants" that school provides. l08 It is in this way that schools cultivate
civic and moral learning in the external mode, not by providing stu-
dents with "an outfit of moral ideas, a new reach-me-down suit of
moral clothing," but by enlarging their moral sensibilities through the
ability to think and feel by listening and responding to one another. 0 9
There is also an internal mode of this conversation, one that may
be carried on within the structures of school but that can occur else-
where as well. The internal mode is manifested in private reflection-
though no less in conversation-on the learning that the student has
acquired in the external mode, which can enlarge, modify, and sub-
tract from it. "[T]he advantage of being able to converse with [one-
self]," writes Oakeshott, quoting Antisthenes, "is the chief advantage a
[person] may hope to get from education." 110 Students engage in the
107 See OAKESHOTr, Engagement and Frustration, supra note 88, at 71; Eisgruber, supra
note 84, at 77 ("It seems inevitable that the teacher will in fact matter more than the text
she assigns. Her attitude and insights will determine whether students approach the text
with enthusiasm or boredom, sympathy or hostility, imagination or torpor.").
108 See MICHAEL OAKESHOTr, On the Theoretical Understanding of Human Conduct, in ON
HUMAN CONDUCT, supra note 87, at 1, 59.
109 See MICHAEL OAKESHOr, The Idea of a University, in THE VOICE OF LIBERAL LEARN-
ING, supra note 87, at 103; MICHAEL OAKESHOTr, On the Civil Condition, in ON HUMAN
CONDUCT, supra note 87, at 115-16; OAKESHOTr, Voice of Poetry, supra note 91, at 489. Lawn
observes,
Something is disclosed or opened up to the participants [in a conversation];
they are modified in the process of mutual interrogation.... [T]he purpose
is not to reach hard and fast conclusions but to open up lost or repressed
lines of enquiry. In genuine conversation we do not arrive at an objective
truth or establish hard and fast conclusions: we learn something about our-
selves as we enter sympathetically the horizon of the other.
Lawn, supra note 87, at 272.
10 OAKESHOTr, The Universities, supra note 105, at 133. It is no accident that Oakeshott
draws from the Cynic tradition to make a point about the highly personal, non-conventional,
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internal mode of conversation when they reconceive themselves
through an internal dialogue, grappling with the world of human un-
derstandings in order constantly to redefine themselves. Indeed, one
of the core functions of education understood as a conversation is "to
make th[e] world more transparent for the student.., and to enable
her to engage with it mindfully."'
Civic and moral learning, on this account, is interminable.11 2
There is no point at which the student of civic and moral learning is
satisfied because
[in] orality is this endless search for the perfect good; an end-
less, practical endeavour resulting in momentary personal
failures and achievements and in a gradual change of moral
ideas and ideals, a change which is perhaps more than mere
change, a progress towards a finer sensibility for social life and
a deeper knowledge of its necessities. 113
The internal mode of the conversation of civic and moral learning en-
ables the student to realize, if only fleetingly, the "intimations and intui-
tions" that he has about himself as these come to reflect his own self
understanding.114 And it is only through an initiation into the habits of
civic and moral thought and expression that have occupied previous
conversants that the student "acquir [es] the ability to throw back upon
the world his own version of a human being in conduct which is both a
self-disclosure and a self-enactment."115
and interior nature of education. See DENIS LAWTON & PETER GORDON, A HISTORY OF WEST-
ERN EDUCATIONAL IDEAS 19-20 (2002).
In See McCabe, supra note 87, at 447.
112 See COREY, supra note 87, at 77-78.
113 See MICHAEL OAKESHOT, Religion and the Moral Life, in RELIGION, POLITICS AND
THE MORAL LIFE, supra note 87, at 39, 44-45. Oakeshott took the metaphor of conversa-
tion from Hobbes, who first used it to describe the "Science" of morality: "For Morall Phi-
losophy is nothing else but the Science of what is Good, and Evill in the conversation, and
Society of mankind." THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 216 (C.B. MacPherson ed., Penguin
Classics 1968) (1651). The metaphor was famously employed by Richard Rorty for episte-
mological purposes of his own. See RICHARD RORTY, PHILOSOPHY AND THE MIRROR OF
NATURE 389-94 (1979) ("If we see knowing not as having an essence, to be described by
scientists or philosophers, but rather as a right, by current standards, to believe, then we
are well on the way to seeing conversation as the ultimate context within which knowledge is
to be understood.').
114 See COREY, supra note 87, at 76.
115 See OAKESHOTIr, Engagement and Frustration, supra note 88, at 67; see also WILLIAMS,
EDUCATION, supra note 87, at 11; McCabe, supra note 87, at 448 ("These skills do not de-
velop naturally and are no essential part of the physiology of human beings. They arise
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As a general matter, the role of religious learning within a conver-
sational theory of education is not difficult to appreciate. Many reli-
gious traditions represent, in part, a series of voices in the conversation
of civic and moral learning with complex and penetrating meanings. 1 6
It seems plausible that cultivating an awareness of and an inclination to
engage those meanings will enrich the student's experience of civic and
moral learning. 117 But one might well wonder how, as a practical mat-
ter, religious learning in either of its modes contributes to this conver-
sation and how its value is manifested. What follows is an attempt to
probe the nature of religious learning's contribution to the conversa-
tion of civic and moral education. 18
1. The External Mode of Religious Learning
First, religious learning enables fuller participation in the external
mode of the conversation of civic and moral education because many
students remain firmly committed to particular religious traditions and
practices.1 19 If students who do not share that commitment (or whose
parents do not) have any chance of tolerating, understanding, and per-
haps even appreciating and befriending their devout peers, they must
learn about what would otherwise be totally alien religious traditions.
The value of developing a sensitive understanding of the way that relig-
ion affects the global political scene, as well as the role of the United
States in it, is also self-evident. Jay Wexler has convincingly argued that
religious learning directly fosters the "secular" aims of civic learning:
[S]chools should teach about religion so that students can
make fully informed decisions about laws and other gov-
ernment actions affecting religious belief and practice and
so they can understand the myriad ways that religious beliefs
only through a relation of close and careful attention between teacher and learner of the
sort that characterizes institutions of liberal learning.").
116 This is not to deny that "religion," whether or not it admits any definition, compre-
hends much more than this. For an objection that the educational outlook offered here
privileges certain kinds of religious experience, as well as a response, see infra notes 303-
304 and accompanying text.
117 Kevin Williams has noted Matthew Arnold's characterization of "culture in terms of
multifaceted 'voices of human experience' made up of 'art, science, poetry, philosophy,
history, as well as of religion.'" WILLIAMS, EDUCATION, supra note 87, at 9 (quoting MAT-
THEW ARNOLD, CULTURE AND ANARCHY 47 (J. Dover Wilson ed., 1966)).
118 See infta notes 119-197 and accompanying text.
119 See infra notes 120-122 and accompanying text.
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affect the way that many Americans think and talk about is-
sues of public importance, including law .... 120
Though teaching a particular religion as true and to the exclusion and
denigration of other religions no doubt would prove divisive and fool-
ish (as well as unconstitutional), avoiding the topic altogether in the
name of a glassy neutrality will create deep divisions and misunder-
standings as well, as students will come to ridicule and fear religious
traditions that seem odd or idiosyncratic. 121
Ignoring or repudiating religious learning thus damages students'
ability to participate in the external conversation of civic and moral
education because it stunts a certain kind of public educational ex-
change. The orientation of this external mode of religious learning is
political because it derives from the reality, not only that there are
many people in school and the larger world whose faith gives them a
revealed political life-plan, but also that religious beliefs are often a
subsurface current in the complex waterways of a human being's po-
litical beliefs. In either of these cases, one's political commitments may
not overlap precisely with those of secular modernity, and Americans
must possess the conversational wherewithal-both procedural and
substantive-to engage that reality fruitfully.122
Yet it is worth emphasizing that the value of the external mode is
not to equip young people with a few modest bits of information so that
they may be "better citizens" or "by virtue of which they might become
an asset rather than a liability to the nation." 23 Proposals urging "reli-
gious literacy" (echoing Hirsch's call for cultural literacy) because reli-
gious information is instrumentally useful for more effective living in
120 Wexler, supra note 3, at 1170.
121 See Hanan Alexander & Terence H. McLaughlin, Education in Religion and Spiritual-
ity, in THE BLACKWELL GUIDE TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION 356, 362 (Nigel Blake et
al. eds., 2003) ("Despite ... [the] justification [of the exclusion of religious learning in
public schools] in terms of neutrality, such a policy tends to lead defacto to a lack of under-
standing and sympathy for religion and spirituality.... .").
Note that my account of internal and external modes of the conversation of educa-
tion, and of religious learning's relationship to them, is entirely different than the "from
the outside" and "from the inside" model of religious education offered by Alexander and
McLaughlin. See id. at 361-72. Different again from each of these is the "from the in-
side/from the outside" approach toward teaching about religion discussed by Warren
Nord. See infra notes 214-218 and accompanying text.
122 See STOUT, supra note 90, at 73. This does not mean that American citizens must
simply accept this reality as an unalterable fact. But it does mean that American citizens
must learn more about alien belief systems so that they may better understand and engage
with traditions at variance with their own.
123 OAKESHoTr, Engagement and Frustration, supra note 88, at 81.
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the world miss the educational impetus of religious learning.1 24 This
vital point is often completely lost by commentators who call for greater
inclusion of religion in the curriculum because it is "relevant," or will
help soothe "current hatreds and antagonisms,"125 or so that rising citi-
zens may get a better sense of "public priorities" or achieve some skill
that will enable them to be better voters, soldiers, or public policy
mavens.1 26 Although civic and moral learning provides certain knowl-
edge, the character of education as a conversation is always essentially
individual, open, and developing. 127 It resists the easy and flaccid ac-
quiescence in the stock social roles and prefabricated sentiments to-
ward which American children are relentlessly swept. 128 Not the small-
est part of what makes a liberal education liberal is that it induces
alienation and foreignness, and there are indeed few areas of human
experience as disconcertingly mysterious to American cultural sensibili-
ties as the potent claims of religion. Jeffrey Stout has acutely observed
that perhaps the crucial social practice in a democracy-the discursive
practice of ethical and political deliberation-demands the cultivation
of a delicate balance in which "people learn to think of themselves as
individuals while identifying with a broader ethical inheritance and po-
litical community."129 The external mode of religious learning operates
within just this discursive-or conversational-equilibrium, speaking to
students' obligations as political and social beings and reconciling the
artificial polarities of the "secular" and the "religious."
2. The Internal Mode of Religious Learning
Because many children (like their parents) are uncertain about
their religious commitments, rigid distinctions between the "religious"
124 See, e.g., PROTHERO, supra note 3, at 5-10; David Carr, Religious Education, Religious
Literacy and Common Schooling: A Philosophy and History of Skewed Reflection, 41 J. PHIL. EDUC.
659, 670 (2007).
125 Carr, supra note 124, at 671.
126 See Branch, supra note 3, at 1433.
127 See Hinchliffe, supra note 87, at 31.
128 See OAKESHOrr, A Place of Learning, supra note 95, at 41. Stout, discussing David
Hollinger's Postethnic America, considers three such "constituencies": the "business elite,"
the "proponents of diasporic consciousness," and the "cultural Right." STOUT, supra note
90, at 291-92. Stout argues provocatively that the standard social roles to which so many
young people are required to conform-jock, nerd, babe, Goth, straight edge, homeboy,
and skate-boarder"--by and large ultimately bottom out in these three entrenched adult
constituencies. Id.
129 See STOUT, supra note 90, at 292-93.
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and the "moral" are unsustainable.1 30 The religiously uncertain may be
"confused,"'131 but that is not necessarily a matter of regret. Confusion is
the result of the partial loss of a particular religious tradition. There
have been enormous benefits to that partial loss. 132 And uncertainty was
the inevitable response to the "secularization" of ethical discourse un-
der the pressures of religious pluralism, as direct appeals to apodictic
religious authority no longer commanded general, let alone universal,
assent. 133
What is regrettable is the renunciation of any desire to understand
the history of one's own religious tradition or others', the reasons for
its (partial) abandonment, and what, if anything, it can continue to of-
fer in the development of one's civic and moral sensibilities. These tra-
ditions of belief and practice ought not to be repudiated unthinkingly
130 See Steven D. Smith, The "Secular," the "Religious, " and the "Moral". What Are We Talk-
ing About?, 36 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 487, 487-88 (2001). It is frequently said that the
United States is a very religious nation; polls consistently indicate that roughly ninety per-
cent of Americans believe in God and that church attendance and membership continue
to be relatively high. See BARRY A. KOSMIN & SEYMOUR P. LACHMAN, ONE NATION UNDER
GOD: RELIGION IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN SOCIETY 9 (1993) (noting that approxi-
mately 58% of Americans believe that religion is "very important" and approximately 94%
believe in God or a "universal spirit"); NORD, supra note 2, at 2; NORD & HAYNES, supra
note 2, at 1; Wexler, supra note 3, at 1161. Professor Robert Putnam has pointed out, how-
ever, that although "religion is today, as it has traditionally been, a central fount of Ameri-
can community life and health," "[c]areful comparisons of survey responses with actual
counts of parishioners in the pews suggest that many of us 'misremember' whether we
actually did make it to services last week." ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COL-
LAPSE AND REVIVAL OF AMERICAN COMMUNITY 71, 79 (2000). Whatever the statistical real-
ity, these studies point to a substantial number of citizens who are uncertain about their
religious commitments.
1s1 Smith, supra note 130, at 503.
132 See MACEDO, supra note 22, at 132-38 (discussing the "transformative ends" of lib-
eral democracy with respect to certain commitments of Roman Catholicism). I disagree
with Professor Macedo, however, when he seems to argue that all "'vertical' patterns of
authority"-such as those found in Roman Catholicism (but certainly not only there)-
are inconsistent with liberal democracy. See id. at 132-33. Liberal democracy depends upon
such patterns to a degree that Macedo seems unwilling to concede. And it is also true that
individual liberty often does not increase as religious belief becomes more "individualistic"
and less hierarchical. See HAMBURGER, supra note 23, at 484-85 ("That American majorities
used the separation of church and state to impose their vision of their religion and their
Americanism upon religious minorities is a sober reminder that as religious liberty be-
comes more individualistic, it does not necessarily increase individual liberty."). Neverthe-
less, Macedo's general claim that liberal democratic values have had a moderating force on
certain unappealing religious commitments seems to be an accurate account of a positive
development. See MACEDO, supra note 22, at 132-38.
133 STOUT, supra note 90, at 93-100. Stout helpfully distinguishes between "seculariza-
tion"-the fact that people can no longer take religious premises for granted in ethical
discourse-and "secularism" -the ideological commitment to a state insulated from the
effects of religious convictions. See id. at 97.
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because of unexamined assumptions that religion simply has no place
in public schools, or that it is too difficult to teach about it constitu-
tionally. This is not to deny that someone may ultimately decide that
one's own or others' religious traditions should be rejected; on the con-
trary134 Yet even more so than for those that have already unequivocally
rejected or embraced religion, religious learning is valuable for the un-
certain who depend in pectore, perhaps even in ways that they would not
consciously acknowledge, upon religious concepts to support their
moral intuitions and commitments. Religious learning is, therefore, a
vital component of the internal mode of the conversation of civic and
moral learning.
It may be helpful to provide two examples of the relationship of
religious learning to the internal mode. These examples, both of which
discuss Christian beliefs, are merely illustrations. As a historical matter,
Christianity has been the dominant religion with which liberal democ-
racies have engaged. Analytically, however, other religious traditions
may be capable of illustrating this relationship equally well or better.
Professor Michael Perry has argued controversially that the liberal
democratic commitment to the essential dignity of every human being
can only be adequately justified through the prism of religious belief.135
"Why do all human beings have inherent dignity?" asks Perry. 36 "In
virtue of what do all human beings have it?"137 Perry answers from the
perspective of an ecumenical Christian: "By becoming persons who love
one another, we fulfill-we perfect-our created nature and thereby
achieve our truest, deepest, most enduring happiness."138 Perry claims
that this response provides an adequate ontological foundation- "au-
thentic well being"-for the commitment to intrinsic human dignity
because it "specif[ies] the source of normativity-the source of the
'should' in the claim that no one should violate any human being." 39
134 This was Mill's point. See supra note 32.
135 See generally Michael J. Perry, The Morality of Human Rights: A Nonreligious Ground?, 54
EMORY L.J. 97 (2005) [hereinafter Perry, Morality of Human Rights]. Professor Perry has
addressed this particular concern before and since. See, e.g., Michael J. Perry, Is the Idea of
Human Rights Ineliminably Religious?, 27 U. RICH. L. REv. 1023, 1035-50 (1993); Michael J.
Perry, Morality and Normativity, 13 LEGAL THEORY 211, 218-30 (2007); Michael J. Perry,
What is "Morality" Anyway?, 45 VILL. L. REv. 69, 74-88 (2000); see also MICHAEL J. PERRY,
THE IDEA OF HUMAN RIGHTS: FOUR INQUIRIES 11-41 (1998). As will become clear, I doubt
that one need accept a position as strong as Perry's to see the value of religious learning
for the development of one's civic and moral sensibilities.
136 Perry, Morality of Human Rights, supra note 135, at 105.
137 Id.
I3 Id. at 114.
139 Id. at 114-15.
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Perry is not out to show that only religious believers are capable of af-
firming the commitment to human dignity; surely this is not true, as
many atheists and agnostics affirm just this belief. 4 Nor is Perry argu-
ing that all religious believers affirm human dignity in virtue of being
religious; again, that plainly would be false, as there is no necessary
connection between religious belief and human dignity.141 "The point,"
says Perry, "is that the ground one who is not a religious believer can
give for the claim that every human being has inherent dignity is ob-
scure. "142
In elaborating upon that obscurity, Perry probes Ronald Dworkin's
arguments for human dignity. Professor Dworkin claims that every per-
son is a "creative masterpiece" of both "natural and human creation,"
and that this status translates to a norm of inviolability.143 For Dworkin,
the source of the status is "the value 'we' attach to every human being
understood as a creative masterpiece." 144 But, says Perry, Dworkin's
"we" is a fiction founded on a consensus that has never existed.145 And
even if one agrees that every human being is a creative masterpiece,
one need not attach much value to that person in consequence.146 A
"masterpiece" is generally associated with aesthetic, not moral, excel-
lence (as Dworkin recognizes). 47 Some people, moreover, seem much
more like masterpieces than others, and it is unclear on this account
why their differences should be ignored in measuring their essential
dignity.148
140 See generally id.
141 See generally Perry, Morality of Human Rights, supra note 135.
142 Id. at 126.
143 Id. at 136 (quoting RONALD DWORKIN, LIFE'S DOMINION: AN ARGUMENT ABOUT
ABORTION, EUTHANASIA, AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 78, 82-83 (1993)).
144 Id.
145 Id. ("Many people do not attach much or even any value to every human being; in-
deed, many people disvalue some human beings."). Of course, Perry's own religiously
anchored, ecumenical Christian approach to the inviolability of every human being is not
shared universally, but he does not make such ambitious claims for it. See id. at 103-18.
146 See Perry, Morality of Human Rights, supra note 135, at 136-37.
147 See DWORKIN, supra note 143, at 83-84.
148 Professor Dworkin writes that human life demands respect because of the
complex creative investment it represents and because of our wonder at the
... processes of nation and community and language through which a hu-
man being will come to absorb ... cultures and forms of life and value, and,
finally, when mental life has begun and flourishes, at the process of internal
personal creation and judgment by which a person will make and remake
himself....
Id. at 84. Dworkin emphasizes this "mental" cultivation as "the most powerful and inevita-
ble source of empathy and communion we have with every other creature who faces the
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The second example is developed byJeremy Waldron in his book,
God, Locke, and Equality: Christian Foundations of John Locke's Political
Thought.149 Professor Waldron's topic is the "character of our deeper
commitment to treating all human beings as equals."150 He explores it
by sedulously examining Locke's views on the equality of the sexes, 151
the implications of the idea of a human "species" for Locke's concep-
tion of equality,152 the relationship between reason, natural law, phi-
losophy, and the human intellect, 153 and others. Waldron argues that
Locke's commitment to human equality is premised on a deeply
theological content [that] ... shapes and informs the ac-
count through and through; the range property on which
Locke relies[154] is simply unintelligible apart from these re-
ligious concerns.... Lockean equality is not fit to be taught
as a secular doctrine; it is a conception of equality that
same frightening challenge," but he does not clarify why human beings who are less "men-
tally" cultivated than others inspire equal "empathy and communion." See id. In fact,
Dworkin carves out an exception for "pathological cases," but it is difficult to see on his
account why one should stop there. See id. at 83.
149 See generally JEREMY WALDRON, GOD, LOCKE, AND EQUALITY: CHRISTIAN FOUNDA-
TIONS OFJOHN LOCKE'S POLITICAL THOUGHT (2002).
150 Id. at 2.
151 Id. at 21-43.
152 Id. at 44-82.
153 Id. at 83-107.
154 Borrowing from Rawls, seeJOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 508 (1972), Waldron
introduces the concept of a "range property":
The idea is that although there is a scale on which one could observe differ-
ences of degree, still once a range has been specified, we may use the binary
property of being within the range, a property which is shared by something
which is in the center of the range and also by something which is just above
its lower threshold.
WALDRON, supra note 149, at 76-77. For Locke, Waldron claims, the relevant range prop-
erty that warrants the belief in human equality is the intellectual power of abstraction to
reason to the existence of God:
So Locke's position seems to be this. Anyone with the capacity for abstraction
can reason to the existence of God, and he can relate the idea of God to
there being a law that applies to him both in his conduct in this world and as
to his prospects for the next. The content of that law may not be available to
everyone's reason, but anyone above the threshold has the power to relate
the idea of such law to what is known by faith and revelation about God's
commandments ....
Id. at 79-80.
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makes no sense except in the light of a particular account of
the relation between man and God.155
To this, one may object that Locke lived long ago and his religious
justifications for equality cannot simply be transplanted into our mod-
ern, pluralistic society. One ought today to endeavor to produce rea-
sons that will appeal to everyone and by which everyone may be rea-
sonably bound. Waldron has several responses. First, with respect to the
particular argument about human equality premised on an intellectual
range property, Waldron claims that someone who denies or is indif-
ferent to the existence of God cannot make the same arguments that
Locke makes. 56 Second, Waldron argues that though Locke's bottom-
line conclusion that atheists should be excluded from political life is
obviously intolerable, that does not vitiate the power of Locke's argu-
ments about the nature of the problem. 5 7
Standing in the shadows is the important question of Rawlsian
public reason and its injunction against appealing to religious convic-
tions in making political judgments. 58 Waldron claims that "[i]f the
Lockean view that I have been outlining is correct, it may be impossi-
155 WALDRON, supra note 149, at 82. That universal "relation between man and God"
bears a substantial resemblance to what Calvin described as the tendency or urge ("nisus")
to believe in God:
There is within the human mind, and indeed by natural instinct, an aware-
ness of divinity. This we take to be beyond controversy. To prevent anyone
from taking refuge in the pretense of ignorance, God himself has implanted
in all men a certain understanding of his divine majesty.... Therefore, since
from the beginning of the world there has been no region, no city, in short,
no household, that could do without religion, there lies in this a tacit confes-
sion of a sense of deity inscribed in the hearts of all.
JOHN CALVIN, INSTITUTES OF THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION 43-44 (Ford Lewis Battles trans.,
1960) (footnotes omitted).
156 WALDRON, supra note 149, at 81 ("An atheist may pretend to talk about the equality
of all members of the human species, but his conception of the human species is likely to
be ... chaotic and indeterminate .... The atheist may pretend to ground our equality in
our rationality, but he will be at a loss to explain why we should ignore the evident differ-
ences in people's rationality.").
157 Id. at 235 (arguing that "[w] e must not reason from rejection of Locke's solution to
the non-existence of the problem he identified" - "namely, his conviction that a society
inhabited by a significant number of people who deny the existence of God is running a
grave risk with its public morality").
158 I do not intend (and am not qualified) to delve into the many debates between
Rawls and his critics, and I leave to the side the controversy over the implications of Rawls's
"proviso." SeeJohn Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 765, 783-84
(1997), reprinted inJOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 462-63 (expanded ed. 2005); see
also SAMUEL FREEMAN, RAWLS 411-14 (2007).
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ble to articulate certain important egalitarian commitments without
appealing to what one takes to be their religious grounds." 159 But at
all events, without an effort to "get to the bottom" of our commitment
to human equality (for fear of causing offense, division, or intellectual
discomfort), we foster not only shallowness of thought but also poten-
tial error on questions of great importance. Waldron concludes that
we should not
congratulate ourselves on having left the religious issues be-
hind us, so far as the defense and elaboration of basic equal-
ity is concerned.... It may seem to us now that we can make
do with a purely secular notion of human equality; but as a
matter of ethical history, that notion has been shaped and
fashioned on the basis of religion. 160
Perry and Waldron are obviously after big game. It is ambitious
indeed to challenge the possibility of freestanding, secular justifica-
tions for the continuing commitment to two fundamental, liberal de-
mocratic ideals. 161 Yet their arguments need not be accepted whole-
sale in order to see the relevance of religious learning for the public
school student. In fact, the position I have in mind is comparatively
15 9 WALDRON, supra note 149, at 237.
160 Id. at 241-42.
161 For another perspective on the religious roots of the idea of human equality, see
George P. Fletcher, Essay, In God's Image: The Religious Imperative of Equality Under Law, 99
COLUM. L. REV. 1608, 1608-29 (1999). For a critique of Perry's position, see the comments
of August 13, 21, and 23, 2007, by Brian Tamanaha, Jack Balkin, and Andrew Koppelman
at http://balkin.blogspot.com (last visited Aug. 5, 2008).
Universal human dignity and equality are obviously not the only ideals held dear by
liberal democratic states; others-tolerance, for example-may be more amenable to
purely secular justification. See WALDRON, supra note 149, at 237-38. But see STEVEN D.
SMITH, GETrING OVER EQUALITY: A CRITICAL DIAGNOSIS OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN
AMERICA 163-84 (2001) (arguing for a conception of tolerance with explicitly religious
foundations). Nevertheless, these are certainly not the only liberal ideals the understand-
ing of which might be deepened by religious learning. Waldron has himself examined the
problem of distance and the obligation to render assistance to others in need by reconsid-
ering the familiar story of the Good Samaritan. SeeJeremy Waldron, Who Is My Neighbor:
Humanity and Proximity, 86 MONIST 333, 333-54 (2003). The Everest stories discussed ear-
lier raise these very concerns. See supra notes 12-20 and accompanying text. Likewise,
Robert Ferguson has observed the dependence on "a spiritual level of explanation" for the
justification and defense of the ideal of "liberty." See Robert A. Ferguson, The Dialectic of
Liberty: Law and Religion in Anglo-American Culture, 1 MODERN INTELL. HIST. 27, 51-52
(2004). And William James famously argued that there is a powerful connection between
the religious virtue of "poverty" -particularly, he felt, as an Islamic ideal-and "the mys-
tery of democracy." See WILLIAM JAMES, THE VARIETIES OF RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE 324
(Martin E. Marty ed., Penguin Books 1982) (1902).
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modest and does not depend on controversial judgments about the
grounds of moral ideals.
It is this. Even if one is skeptical of Perry's and Waldron's respective
claims that human dignity and equality can only or best be understood
by exploring the religious beliefs that support them, one still should
grant that religious beliefs are and continue to be an important source for
understanding and reflecting upon those commitments. They represent
a unique category of experience and understanding that have, through
history, exerted a "moral pull" more deeply embedded than the elegant
intellectualism of other accounts.162 And again, even if Perry is wrong
that "there is no way" to address these sorts -of questions satisfactorily
without reference to religion (and he may well be wrong),163 religious
learning is germane to the conversation of civic and moral learning: it is
a complicated and highly textured part of the inheritance of moral and
civic understandings, and one into which students ought to be initiated
for the sake of their own moral development.164
In specific, religious learning represents an important contribu-
tion to the internal conversation of civic and moral education. If the
moral uncertainties of the religiously unsure about ideals such as hu-
man equality or intrinsic human dignity can be, even to a limited ex-
tent, better or more insightfully understood, the nature of their moral
intuitions and commitments should be considered and explored in an
atmosphere of open, civil, and critical inquiry.165 But that type of care-
fully guided reflection can occur only if public schools are willing to
broach religion's moral valence. The claim, often repeated by the U.S.
Supreme Court, that such an initiation into the world of religious be-
162 Smith, supra note 130, at 506; cf GREENAWALT, supra note 21, at 28 ("[Rleligious
perspectives commonly provide support for ideas, such as human equality, that may also be
reached on other grounds; and an understanding of religious perspectives helps us to
grasp the political currents of our society.").
163 Perry, Morality of Human Rights, supra note 135, at 121.
164 See GREENAWALT, supra note 21, at 143 ("Schools often take definite positions-for
example, that all people should be treated equally by government-that are powerfully
supported by the great majority of religious views in the community."). Greenawalt surely
means that religious beliefs often overlap with fundamental liberal democratic commit-
ments, offering implicit support. See id. It is not as clear how powerful he believes those
religious justifications are or the degree to which they should be explored in public
schools. See id.
165 See PELIKAN, supra note 68, at 19 ("For even if-or especially if-the tradition of our
past is a burden that the next generation must finally drop, it will not be able to drop it, or
to understand why it must drop it, unless it has some sense of what its content is and of
how and why it has persisted for so long.").
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liefs and understandings carries with it the threat of "divisiveness" 166
or social danger is worth remembering, but it is in the end both my-
opic and, more importantly, beside the point. Myopic, because it
masks the divisiveness and social danger that festers in the superficial
cultivation of civic and moral ideals.167 And beside the point, because
the very idea of civic and moral cultivation as an educational enter-
prise is ultimately not a pat program of "socialization" or the infusion
of a Volksgeist, let alone a "civil religion,"168 but the awakening and de-
velopment of a personal sensibility. 69 This is the internal mode of re-
ligious learning; it aspires to reconcile the artificially rigid categories
of the "moral" and the "religious" as they are manifested over time in
the layered personality of the individual. 170
In undertaking the type of guided reflection about religion sug-
gested by these two modes of religious learning, the public school
should strive to be inclusive. Majority and minority religious traditions
should be represented, and familiar and unfamiliar traditions should
be taught and discussed with the same open and intellectually curious
166 See, e.g., Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 698 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring) (ob-
serving that the religion clauses "seek to avoid that divisiveness based upon religion that
promotes social conflict, sapping the strength of government and religion alike"); id. at
709 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (commenting on "[g]overnment's obligation to avoid divisive-
ness" by erecting a "wall of separation between church and state"); Lemon v. Kurtzman,
403 U.S. 602, 622 (1971) (discussing the "divisive political potential" of state-sponsored
religious institutions and activities). For a cogent critique of the Supreme Court's argu-
ment about divisiveness, see Richard W. Garnett, Religion, Division, and the First Amendment,
94 GEO. LJ. 1667, 1705, 1708-24 (2006) (noting that the argument "appears to have re-
vived somewhat in recent years").
167 An overly acute fear of religion's political divisiveness might result in superficial
civic and moral cultivation in the sense either that it would be insubstantial or, what is just
as likely, that it would be partial. See HAMBURGER, supra note 23, at 453-54 (describing
charges of divisiveness leveled at Roman Catholics, and in particular at parochial schools,
in the mid-twentieth century and the aspirations toward "ecumenical harmony" motivating
them).
168 SeeJEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, The Social Contract, in THE SOCIAL CONTRACT AND THE
FIRST AND SECOND DISCOURSES 149, 252-53 (Susan Dunn ed. & trans., 2002) (-There is,
therefore, a purely civil profession of faith, the articles of which it is the duty of the sover-
eign to determine, not exactly as dogmas of religion, but as sentiments of sociability, with-
out which it is impossible to be a good citizen or a faithful subject." (footnote omitted)).
169 See OAKESHOTr, Engagement and Frustration, supra note 88, at 71. The occasional agi-
tation about whether to declare the United States a "Christian nation," like the "cult of
Christentum und Deutschtum" in pre-World War I Germany, is a paradigm of civic, moral,
and religious learning as "socialization." See REINHOLD NIEBUHR, MORAL MAN AND IM-
MORAL SOCIETY: A STUDY IN ETHICS AND POLITICS 97 (Scribner 1960) (1932).
170 The internal mode of religious learning in part reflects Reinhold Niebuhr's skepti-
cism about the power of "religious resources" to effect large-scale social transformation,
and conversely his sense that those resources were vital wellsprings of individual moral
development. See NIEBUHR, supra note 169, at 51-82.
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attitudes.171 Nevertheless, it is important to distinguish between beliefs
that can be understood as at some level compatible with the fundamen-
tal commitments of liberal democratic society and other beliefs that are
incompatible with or unequivocally repudiate them. Though discussion
and reflection within the conversational model is always open-ended, it
is not wedded to a kind of bloodless, noncommittal multiculturalism.172
Religious views may fare poorly or well in the eyes of students within
that framework, but the public school's obligation to initiate the stu-
dent into the conversation of civic and moral learning demands that it
take religious learning, in as much of its complexity as practicable,
within its gaze. 173
Stephen Macedo has suggested that authoritarian and "totalistic
religious or moral views" are undesirable from a civic perspective and
171 Still, I agree with Nord and Haynes that "[in choosing the less influential religions,
it is wise and just to give attention to those that are practiced locally to give all children the
sense that their traditions are taken seriously." NORD & HAYNES, supra note 2, at 48.
172 This point raises important questions of teaching style. Teachers should not require
students to ask themselves directly, for example, "Do I agree with the Roman Catholic view
on women in the ministry?" or "Do I disagree with the Muslim requirement to wear the
Hijab?" Instead, teachers should approach these topics one step removed. For example,
"How would an observant Catholic think about the question of women in the ministry?"
This approach, which Mill first suggested, see MILL, supra note 32, at 111, reflects Nord and
Haynes' argument that "[t] he key skill [a] ... teacher needs when teaching about religious
traditions is the ability to teach through attribution." See NORD & HAYNES, supra note 2, at
71. The "attribution argument" also applies when teachers introduce criticisms of religious
beliefs. See Wexler, supra note 3, at 1258.
173 Greenawalt addresses the problem of "spillover effects," the influence of liberal in-
struction on students' religions:
Because potential spillover effects may often be desirable from a civic stand-
point (and because teachers cannot confidently say when tensions between
perspectives are serious), teachers should counter these effects only when do-
ing so does not undercut the educational policy that may cause the spillover
and when they need not decide whether an arguable tension is genuine. By
way of illustration, students should be shown how a believer in authoritarian
religion can accept liberal democracy; they should not be told that ideas of
secular tolerance and respect have no relevance for religion.
GREENAWALT, supra note 21, at 32-33. Greenawalt is of course correct that students should
not be told that secular ideals have no relevance for religion since some religious beliefs
are not only consistent with but also offer substantial justifications for certain secular val-
ues. See id. But it is preferable to let the religious beliefs stand on their own merits (after
proper explanation), just as other contested ideas do. Greenawalt is also correct to observe
that teachers may be uncomfortable discerning areas of possible tension, see id. at 32, but
this is precisely a reason to voice those tensions, enabling students to learn about and re-
flect on them, without offering definitive conclusions. Some of the difficulties of teacher
competence and bias are discussed infra in the text accompanying notes 256-276.
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should never be accommodated, 174 while other religious views com-
patible with that perspective are praiseworthy.175 He is correct that con-
versational engagement may show that particular religious beliefs are
too far outside the mainstream because of their "resistance to basic civic
values." 176 But if carried out with the requisite delicacy, it is likely to
show the complex structure, history, and development of religious be-
liefs and practices as well. It will therefore often be the case that reli-
gious beliefs and liberal civic and moral ideals will be interconnected in
complicated ways. Thus, some religious beliefs and practices may be
attractive even for those who may not accept the whole of the tradition
upon which the belief is based. 77 A kind of religious bricolage might well
be the result,178 in which religious beliefs may bring different perspec-
tives to one's commitment to liberal democratic ideals; or they may
modify those ideals; or they may show themselves to be incompatible
with them. 79
An example may be helpful.'aa The Catholic Church maintains
that only males can be priests.181 In her public school comparative relig-
ion class, 182 Eve learns about the theoretical justifications for this belief
from the Roman Catholic point of view and its relationship to her exist-
ing moral and civic ideals. Eve is struck by the practice's apparent in-
174 See MACEDO, supra note 22, at 196-97.
175 See id. at 38-39.
176 See id. at 210. Religious views that, for example, promote slavery or hateful attitudes
toward others fall into this category. I discuss a more difficult case--ordination of women
as Roman Catholic priests-infta in the text accompanying notes 180-194.
177 See MICHAEL J. PERRY, RELIGION IN POLITICS: CONSTITUTIONAL AND MORAL PER-
SPECTIVES 80 (1997) ("[T]he moral insight, the insight into the requirements of human
well-being, achieved over time by a religious tradition, as the yield of a lived experience of
an historically extended human community, might well have a resonance and indeed an
authority that extends far beyond just those who accept the tradition's religious claims.").
178 The idea of "moral bricolage" is developed in JEFFREY STOUT, ETHICS AFTER BABEL:
THE LANGUAGES OF MORALS AND THEIR DISCONTENTS 74-77, 293-94 (1988).
179 See MACEDO, supra note 22, at 172.
180 Before proceeding, it is worth emphasizing that I cannot do justice to the range of
religious understandings even on a comparatively limited and familiar question germane
to a single tradition. The point of the example is to demonstrate how learning about reli-
gious beliefs, even those that may form part of a tradition other than one's own, contrib-
utes to one's initiation into the ongoing conversation of civic and moral learning.
181 See 1983 CODE c.1024 (Canon Law) ("A baptized male alone receives sacred ordina-
tion validly."); see also Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, Inter Insigniores:
Declaration on the Admission of Women to the Ministerial Priesthood 6 (Oct. 15, 1976)
[hereinafter Inter Insigniores]. See generally Terrance R. Kelly, Canaanites, Catholics and the
Constitution: Developing Church Doctrine, Secular Law and Women Priests, 7 RUTGERS J. L. &
RELIGION 3 (2005) (documenting the historical prohibition against female priests).
182 Assume that this is an elective, high-school class. See infra note 309 and accompany-
ing text.
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compatibility with other ideals that she holds dear-human equality,
for example. She may note that the government prohibits employment
discrimination against women in a variety of other contexts, and she
may wonder what arguments, if any, support the continued exclusion of
women from the Catholic priesthood18 3 Eve may observe several his-
torical Catholic claims about the native inferiority of women, as well as
the arguments of contemporary women (some of them Catholic) that
.religion, in general, and the Catholic Church, in particular, have not
sufficiently recognized the talents and contributions of women." 184
One argument for the exclusion of women from the priesthood
is that crucial religious figures in the Christian tradition-for exam-
ple, God, Christ, the archangels, the apostles, and many of the proph-
ets-have always been represented as male. 18 Far fewer key figures
have been female. 86 Believers have for centuries associated the gen-
der of these figures with their particular roles so that, as C.S. Lewis
once remarked upon hearing that the Church of England was consid-
ering a proposal to ordain women priests,
Christians think that God Himself has taught us how to speak
of Him. To say that it does not matter [whether women are
ordained] is to say either that all the masculine imagery is not
inspired, is merely human in origin, or else that, though in-
spired, it is quite arbitrary and unessential. And this is surely
intolerable: or, if tolerable, it is an argument not in favour of
Christian priestesses but against Christianity.... [A] child who
has been taught to pray to a Mother in Heaven would have a
religious life radically different from that of a Christian
child.18 7
183 Professor Douglas Laycock has argued that, constitutionality aside, Title VII "for-
bids the requirement that Catholic priests be male." Douglas Laycock, Towards a General
Theory of the Religion Clauses: The Case of Church Labor Relations and the Right to Church Auton-
omy, 81 COLUM. L. REv. 1373, 1375 (1981). The inquiry here is not about government-
imposed limitations on religious institutions but instead about how moral positions under-
lying certain religious practices may or may not support and be supported by other fun-
damental moral commitments, including those of liberal democracies.
184 See Susan J. Stabile, A Catholic Vision of the Corporation, 4 SEATrLE J. SOC. JUST. 181,
187 n.45 (2005).
18 See C.S. LEWIS, Notes on the Way, 29 TIME & TIDE 830 (1948), reprinted as Priestesses in
the Church?, in GOD IN THE DocK: ESSAYS ON THEOLOGY AND ETHics 234, 237 (Walter
Hooper ed., 1970).
186 See id.
187 Id.
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On this view, because priests (as well as bishops, cardinals, and popes)
stand in a unique, hierarchical relationship between the religious
faithful and God-one in which God's nature is reflected imperfectly
in the priest-to ordain female priests is to alter fundamentally what it
is to be a Catholic both as a matter of revelation and tradition.1a
Eve may accept Lewis's argument. She may recognize the impor-
tance of hierarchical structure within the Catholic Church and she may
be able to reconcile the commitment to that structure with her belief in
the basic equality of men and women. Perhaps she will be aided in that
reconciliation by the recognition that hierarchies of various kinds-of
education, wealth, social status, family structure, and political power, to
name only a few-not only inhere in but are constitutive of American
democratic social life. Those hierarchies lend a valuable stability to the
institutions that they structure. The seeming tension may also demand
of Eve that she explore the contours of her belief in the equality of the
sexes. "Human equality" is not an obvious and self-applying ideal; it in-
vites individual interpretation that is likely to be the subject of vigorous
disagreement.18 9
Eve may also reject Lewis's argument, or she may reject it selec-
tively-expressing her assent or dissent, as Oakeshott had it, "in gradu-
ated terms."190 For example, she may not equate the ordination of
women with the subversion of all gender in the Christian tradition. Eve
might agree with Lewis that the masculinity of God, Christ, and St. Mi-
chael is an important doctrinal and hierarchical feature of Catholi-
188 See Inter Insigniores, supra note 181, 130 ("Christ is a man.... [T] herefore ... ac-
tions... in which Christ himself.., is represented.., must be taken by a man.").
189 Pope John Paul I[ offered an elegant, though deeply contestable, interpretation of
human equality:
The personal resources of femininity are certainly no less than the resources
of masculinity: they are merely different. Hence a woman, as well as a man,
must understand her "fulfillment" as a person, her dignity and vocation, on
the basis of these resources, according to the richness of the femininity which
she received on the day of creation and which she inherits as the expression
of the "image and likeness of God" that is specifically hers. The inheritance of
sin suggested by the words of the Bible- "Your desire shall be for your hus-
band, and he shall rule over you" -can be conquered only by following this
path. The overcoming of this evil inheritance is, generation after generation,
the task of every human being, whether woman or man. For whenever man is
responsible for offending a woman's personal dignity and vocation, he acts
contrary to his own personal dignity and vocation.
Pope John Paul U, Apostolic Letter Mulieris Dignitatem 1 10 (Aug. 15, 1988).
190 OAKESHOrr, Voice of Poetry, supra note 91, at 491-92 n.1.
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cism,191 but she might disagree that the connection between God and
his priests must necessarily be one of gender. In that context, Eve may
instead be more persuaded by the claim that men and women are
equal in their mutual subjection to one another in Christ, and that this
basic human equality is a powerful argument for ordaining women-
i.e., that women and men, being fundamentally equal before God, are
both capable of representing and reflecting Christ as priests.192 Another
possibility is that Eve, after considering the Catholic Church's position
on the ordination of women, simply will not be able to reconcile the
tension between that view and her belief in human equality. She will
therefore reject the prohibition on the ordination of women because it
is overly "resistan [t] to [the] civic values" that she holds dear,193 and, if
she is inclined toward religious reform, she may work to change official
Catholic doctrine to reflect her own moral understandings. Disagree-
ment, even when voiced in the strongest terms, is still expressive: it pre-
supposes a wish to continue to engage in a conversational exchange
with the community of others with whom one disagrees. 194
Eve's particular conclusions may be interesting in their own right,
but it is far more important to recall that Eve is a high school student
who is only beginning to learn and think about these questions. Her
191 See LEWIS, supra note 185, at 237. But see Pope John Paul II, supra note 189, 8 ("If
there is a likeness between Creator and creatures, it is understandable that the Bible would
refer to God using expressions that attribute to him both 'masculine' and 'feminine' quali-
ties.").
192 See Susan J. Stabile, Can Secular Feminists and Catholic Feminists Work Together to Ease
the Conflict Between Work and Family?, 4 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 432, 436-37, 442 (describing the
Catholic concept of freedom as one of equal subjection to the God who gives all lives pur-
pose and meaning); see also Elizabeth A. Johnson, Responses to Rome, COMMONWEAL, Jan. 26,
1996, at 11 (noting that Jesus himself never ordained the twelve aposdes, and did not
thereby create a priesthood as such, whether male or female, and that "women were
among the most active and faithful of apostles and disciples").
193 See MACEDO, supra note 22, at 210.
194 See STOUT, supra note 90, at 299. According to Stout:
Many Christians have faced hard decisions over whether they could continue
in good conscience to remain members in good standing of a group that, say,
bans women from the priesthood .... But this should remind us that no so-
cial body, including the church, provides immunity from the dilemmas and
conflicts of membership.... The only alternative is full-fledged separatism,
which involves commitment to a group that is small enough and uniform
enough to eliminate ambivalence altogether, at least for a while. But why
would I want to confine my discursive community to the people who already
agree with me on all essential matters? Isn't part of the point of trying to hold
one another responsible discursively that we do not agree on everything and
therefore need to talk things through?
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conclusions are likely to change-indeed, one hopes that they will
change, many times-as the circumstances of her life add layers of ex-
perience and wisdom and as she continues to participate in the conver-
sation of civic and moral learning. The point of religious learning is nei-
ther to arm Eve for more dexterous socio-political combat with a hostile
world nor to fix certain views in the imagined amber of her moral per-
sonality. Whatever conclusions a high school student may reach, the aim
of religious learning must always be to enrich her civic and moral con-
versational engagements. Religious learning is therefore imparted-
taught about, studied, discussed, and reflected upon-within the same
educational mise-en-scine as are other kinds of civic and moral under-
standings. When difficult religious questions arise, teachers should avoid
arriving at firm conclusions, but they should not shy away from present-
ing arguments, pointing out areas of tension with other moral ideals,
and offering persuasive and less persuasive ways to reconcile those ten-
sions. All of this must be done delicately, to avoid the impression that
the teacher is pronouncing judgment on questions open to reasonable
disagreement. But the primary objective remains educational: the
teacher should cultivate in his students the ability to engage with and
explore the voices of religious traditions for their own moral develop-
ment. 195 The aim must be to make Eve feel the insoluble conflicts of
values-the discomforts, the complexities, the tragic choices, losses and
predicaments-that make a liberal education liberal.
This modal theory of religious learning within the metaphor of
conversation is undeniably abstract, and it would be naive to claim that
it is the only conceptual resource needed to guide the cultivation of
religious learning in public schools, or that it will resolve all of the sun-
dry and murky questions of constitutional law and education policy
that await. 196 No theory can do that in an area as contested as this one.
But the external and internal modes of religious learning provide a
195 See id. at 112.
In a religiously plural society such as ours, it is even more important than in
other circumstances to bring into reflective expression commitments that
would otherwise remain implicit in the lives of the religious communities.
Members of a religious communion can benefit from such expression by
learning about themselves and putting themselves in a position to reflect
critically on their commitments. Outsiders can benefit from listening in, so as
to gain a better grasp on the premises that our fellow citizens rarely have an
opportunity to articulate in full.
Id.
196 For convenience, I will simply refer to the modes of religious learning respectively
as the "external mode" and the "internal mode."
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useful starting point in analyzing the relationship of religious learning
to the cultivation of the civic and moral ideals of liberal democracies.
The sections that follow test the theory against various practical con-
cerns.
197
I. APPLYING THE MODAL THEORY OF RELIGIOUS LEARNING
Thus far, this Article has aimed to give a full account of the prob-
lem of religious learning, in the belief that no policy movement is pos-
sible without a thorough understanding of the relationship between
religious learning and liberal education. 98 This Part applies the Arti-
cle's modal theory of religious learning to several curricular questions
with significant Establishment Clause implications to explore how the
two modes might manifest the value of religious learning in public
schools. 199
A. Religious Learning and History/Social Studies
Kent Greenawalt has observed that "[a]ny history of humankind
is woefully incomplete without serious attention to religion. A fair sur-
vey of world history must include consideration of the place of relig-
ions, including ones that are relatively unfamiliar to most Americans
... as central aspects of diverse cultures." 200 Greenawalt's argument
seems most germane to the external mode: it claims that teaching
about religion can broaden students' conversational horizons by culti-
vating their political personae.201 As previously discussed, the U.S. Su-
preme Court has held that the history of religion can be studied as a
part of the history of humanity without running afoul of the First
Amendment.20 2 Jay Wexler has developed a more instrumental claim
that the ability to consider and express arguments from a variety of
perspectives, including religious perspectives, is a valuable skill for
197 See infra notes 198-252 and accompanying text.
198 See supra notes 1-197 and accompanying text.
199 See infra notes 200-252 and accompanying text. The situations examined in this Ar-
ticle are highly selective; they are intended as an initial test of the theory's application to a
handful of concrete cases, not as an exhaustive study.
200 GREENAWALT, supra note 21, at 127. Much of the discussion in this Part reacts to
Greenawalt's important and illuminating recent treatment of these curricular questions.
201 See id.; NORD & HAYNES, supra note 2, at 8.
202 See, e.g., Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 225 (1963); see also
Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 607 (1987) (Powell, J., concurring) ("[S]ince religion
permeates our history, a familiarity with the nature of religious beliefs is necessary to un-
derstand many historical as well as contemporary events.").
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future citizens: "[T] he citizen must be able to think about the relevant
public issue from a perspective different from his or her own and to
reason about the desirability of the proposed government action from
within a different world view."203 Teaching about religion promotes
these abilities by broadening students' fund of knowledge. 20 4
Yet these perspectives, including the Supreme Court's, fail to
recognize that religious learning, as part of the study of history and
social studies, contributes to the conversation at the heart of civic and
moral learning. Wexler writes, for example:
[A]nyone considering the issue of whether religious commu-
nities ought to take a public stand on civil rights issues would
... naturally try to remember what he or she knows about how
religious communities have participated in civil rights issues in
the past.... Thus, a student who never learned about the role
of Christianity in the civil rights movement of the 1960s or in
the abolitionist movement of the mid-nineteenth century
would have no choice but to rest his opinion on this very im-
portant public issue on a radically incomplete knowledge of
the facts that are necessary to the problem's resolution.2 05
But to render this sort of argument plausible-that is, to explain why it
is important that a student learn the history of religious involvement in
political enterprises-more is necessary than simply acknowledging the
usefulness of being able to recall historical events to support present
policy commitments. That type of recitation might prove instrumen-
tally useful as a rhetorical ploy, but by itself it says relatively little about
the moral and civic worth of the religious belief. For that, the student
would also need to reflect upon whether a particular religious belief
ought to be used to support (or oppose) a past policy commitment, as
well as why that or another religious claim should do so for his present
purposes. The point is not only that learning and thinking about reli-
gious beliefs "promote [s] mutual understanding and civic peace"206 but
also that the same engagement with religious ideas may enrich one's
own internal discursive understanding of the particular moral ideal at
issue. The value of religious learning is educational: it contributes an
additional voice to the external and internal conversation of the stu-
dent's civic and moral development.
203 See Wexler, supra note 3, at 1200.
204 See id.
205 Id. at 1202-03 (footnotes omitted). To like effect is Branch, supra note 3, at 1433.
206 See Wexler, supra note 3, at 1214.
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An important practical consideration is how deeply a textbook or a
teacher should engage with religious perspectives in a history or social
studies class. One of the primary difficulties is "descriptive accuracy in
the face of complex nuances,"207 as there are few religions, if any, with a
single, distinctive, and monolithic point of view. And yet decisions about
emphasis and focus inhere in the teaching of history generally. In pro-
viding an account of the American Civil War, will texts emphasize the
economic causes of southern secession? The importance of immigration
in the northeast? Competing understandings of federalism? Or will
teachers focus on the question of slavery? Or will they concentrate on
particular battles and military strategy? Or will teachers instead high-
light the views of particularly important historical figures-Abraham
Lincoln and Jefferson Davis, for example? Considerations of descriptive
accuracy and proper emphasis apply nearly equally to many other com-
plex, multifaceted historical events and eras.208 The fact that choices
must be made about what and what not to teach, and that in conse-
quence something meaningful may be omitted or something may be
said with which somebody disagrees, does not distinguish religious
learning from historical instruction generally.209 The U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the First Circuit has held that parents have no constitutional
right "to dictate the curriculum at the public school to which they have
chosen to send their children. '"2 10 Presumably that principle would apply
207 GREENAWALT, supra note 21, at 129.
208 One might claim that although the issues of slavery, Southern secession, Northern
immigration, and so on are all relevant to a full understanding of the causes of the Civil
War, a teacher who presents a certain view of, for example, Buddhism, might actually be
teaching about views that some Buddhists utterly reject. Admittedly, the parallel between
religious learning and teaching about the Civil War is not exact. Yet someone who claims
that the slavery question is singularly important, and that when studying the Civil War,
most if not all instructional time should be devoted to it, might object to spending any
time on what for him are other comparatively minor issues. Or someone might take an
especially dim view of the influence of particular figures like Lincoln, favoring instead a
focus on broad demographic and economic forces.
The point is that teaching about any complicated historical event involves making de-
cisions about areas of emphasis that will inevitably displease someone. It is true that in the
case of disciplines with little direct religious connection, these choices are far less likely to
implicate the constitutional prohibition on sponsorship of religious ideas; but it is possible
to explore certain religious understandings and not others without necessarily implying
anything about sponsorship. See, e.g., Schempp, 374 U.S. at 225; see also supra notes 50-51
and accompanying text; infra notes 209-211 and accompanying text.
209 See text accompanying supra notes 101-104 for the related point about the multi-
cultural challenge to education conceived as a conversation.
210 Brown v. Hot, Sexy & Safer Prods., Inc., 68 F.3d 525, 533 (1st Cir. 1995).
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to curricular issues that implicate religious learning but that do not vio-
late the Establishment Clause.211
Another complex question is how deeply a teacher or textbook
should probe religious beliefs in describing a particular history and
how much should be said. Professor Warren Nord has provided a spec-
trum of eight possible approaches to instruction about religion, the
range of which spans avoiding any mention of religion at one extreme
to arguing for a particular religious point of view as true at the other.212
The most interesting of Nord's possible approaches fall in the mid-
dle.213
Option four involves teaching about religion from "the inside"-
immersing students in primary and secondary sources in order "to
make sense of the world in a particular religious way," and not merely
to know certain basic facts about a religion or to recite its central ten-
ets. 214 Option four also demands instruction about religion from "the
outside," considering what is common to religions and the differences
among religions, as well as subjecting religious claims to questioning
and discussion in an open and respectful atmosphere.215 Thus, for ex-
ample, when Puritan history is studied, Nord and Charles Haynes argue
that educators should present both the sense of religious mission that
informed the Puritans' desire to establish a "holy commonwealth," and
how the Puritans' missionary political zeal impacted early colonial his-
tory.2 16 If the topic is a religious faith itself, such as Islam, students
should be taught about the central theological conceptions, the em-
phasis on the transcendence and oneness of Allah, and the basis for the
Muslim belief in the Qur'an as revelation, as well as about the character
of Muslim life and the spiritual example of Muhammad.2 17 Once stu-
dents are able to understand Islam from the "inside," it is then appro-
211 See id. A recent report by the American Textbook Council, for example, found that
social studies textbooks used by Baltimore-area public schools contained disputed, but not
necessarily factually incorrect, information about Islam that was presented as if it was uncon-
troversial. SeeJosh Kowalkowski, Junior High School Textbooks Lack Accuracy on Islam, Report Says,
EXAMINER.COM, June 17, 2008, http://www.examiner.com/a-1444884--Junior high school_
textbookslack..accuracy.onIslamreport says.html (reporting that the study found that
"[o]utright textbook errors about Islam are not the main problem" but that "[t]he more
serious failure is the presence of disputed definitions and claims that are presented as estab-
lished facts").
212 NORD, supra note 2, at 249-51.
213 See NORD & HAYNES, supra note 2, at 50.
214 Id.
215 Id. at 52.
216 Id. at 83-84.
217 Id. at 85-86.
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priate that they also discuss the place of Islam globally, different beliefs
and practices within Islam, and Islam's political and sociological com-
mitments-i.e., from the "outside."218
Nord's fifth option would have the text or teachers "consider reli-
gious ways of understanding the world as live contenders for the truth, to
be argued about and critically assessed," but without the teacher or text
drawing any conclusions. 219 Greenawalt is skeptical about option five:
I believe teachers.., should be cautious about in-class critical
discussions of the merits of controverted religious claims....
Children with minority or "bizarre" beliefs might feel ganged
up on by their peers, whose approval they crave, and they
might believe that the way the teacher puts crucial questions
implies negative or positive views.... Critical discussion can
work fairly well with a skilled teacher, and mature students
who have diverse religious views and are respectful of each
other's perspectives; but in other circumstances the risks are
too great.220
Greenawalt is correct that discussion of sensitive topics among students
runs the risk of alienating outsiders or minority believers and nonbe-
lievers.2 21 When discussion and reflection on religious topics occurs in
class, Greenawalt is right to insist that it be managed with the requisite
delicacy on the part of both students and teacher.222 But in recom-
mending against in-class discussion, he implies that if these sorts of ex-
changes occur at all, it is better that they take place on students' own
time.223 Yet to the extent that such discussions do occur outside class,
they are more likely to end in misunderstandings, hurt feelings, and
uncivil exchanges than would be the case if they were undertaken
within the formal and more carefully controlled conversational appara-
tus that characterizes the external mode of religious learning.2 24 More
importantly, religious learning as a component of civic and moral
2 1 8 NORD & HAYNES, supra note 2, at 86.
219 NORD, supra note 2, at 250. Option five seems necessarily to incorporate option
four-the "inside/outside" approach-since an informed conversation about the truth of
the religious tradition or historical era being studied could not occur without the back-
ground instruction provided by option four.
220 GREENAWALT, supra note 21, at 131-32.
221 See id. at 132.
222 See id.
223 See id. at 133. He takes no position on whether such outside-class discussions should
occur, and if so how frequent they should be, but it does seem likely that they will occur.
224 See supra notes 120-129 and accompanying text.
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learning demands that religious beliefs be carefully, respectfully, non-
oppressively discussed and reflected upon within the conversational
structures of school. In the context of a history course, reflection of this
kind is necessary precisely because it brings to light, through the two
modes of religious learning, how and why religious beliefs and ideas
have had an influence on major historical events.
But option five is highly problematic for a different reason. It de-
scribes and approaches different religious traditions as "contenders for
the truth."225 This orients the exchange in a misguidedly argumentative
direction before it has even begun, and it runs roughshod over the
crucial idea that education is essentially individual and open-ended and
that it aims at an initiation of students into the world of civic and moral
understandings. It also unconstitutionally implies that the religious tra-
ditions studied and discussed are the only ones that legitimately claim
truth value.2 26
Neither of these options, therefore, provides a satisfying explana-
tion of the conversational value of religious learning for instruction in
history. Religious learning in history and social studies is worthwhile for
its contribution to the external and internal modes of civic and moral
learning. In its external mode, religious learning opens possibilities for
mutual understanding and tolerance, broadening students' intellectual
horizons within the communal configuration offered by school. The
classroom offers the best forum for discussion and reflection of this
kind because its procedural and substantive structures are more con-
ducive than most to the respectful exchange of ideas and their fullest
consideration. In its internal mode, religious learning enables students
to begin to participate in an ongoing reflection upon the relationship
of religious beliefs and practices to their other moral commitments.
B. Religious Learning and English, Music, and Art
Most of the arguments for religious learning in history courses also
apply to literature and arts classes. Apart from the question of teaching
holy texts in a literature class 227 or of offering elective courses on the
225 NORD, supra note 2, at 250.
226 See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 607 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring) ("When
the government appropriates religious truth, it 'transforms rational debate into theologi-
cal decree.'"); Schempp, 374 U.S. at 276 (Brennan,J., concurring) ("The truths of the Bible
are the truths of religion, which do not come within the province of the public school."
(quoting Ring v. Bd. of Educ., 92 N.E. 251, 256 (Ill. 1910))).
27 See, e.g., Aguillard, 482 U.S. at 608 (Powell, J., concurring); Stone v. Graham, 449
U.S. 39, 42 (1980); Schempp, 374 U.S. at 225.
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historical influence of a single religious text,228 it is worth noting that
many canonical works of literature and art cannot be understood or
appreciated adequately without some grounding in religion. Inasmuch
as teachers must "explain the basic religious understanding that under-
lies a religious text,"229 they must also delve into the religious under-
standings that inform "secular" texts not explicitly tied to a religious
faith. By learning about this background, reflecting upon it, and dis-
cussing it with teachers and classmates, students' own views about a va-
riety of moral propositions will inevitably be affected. Students learn to
participate in the conversation of civic and moral learning when they
address themselves seriously to the religious themes and ideas in works
of art. Nord and Haynes discuss these qualities of literary and artistic
experience, all of which are relevant to the operation of the internal
mode:
Virtually all "great" literature and art address and deepen our
understanding of those existential questions about the mean-
ing of life that are inescapable for any reflective person: Who
am I? What is the nature of my humanity? How do I make
sense of suffering and death? What is justice? What is my duty
in life? For what can I hope? What is love? What is the human
condition? Often these are called "religious" questions, in part
because religions have traditionally provided widely accepted
answers to them, in part because they are ultimately impor-
tant.230
As they critically assess works of literature and art with connec-
tions to religious experience and belief, students confront their own
views about the "ultimate" questions, 231 reflecting upon and discussing
whether that which authors and artists have said exerts any "moral
pull" 232 for them.
228 See, e.g., Bradford Wiles, School Board Approves Bible Course for High Schoo4 OURVAL-
LEY.ORG, http://ourvalley.org/news.php?viewStory=2660 (last visited Aug. 3, 2008) (de-
scribing the elective course now offered by one Virginia school district in "'The Bible in
History and Literature").
229 GREENAWALT, supra note 21, at 136.
230 NORD & HAYNES, supra note 2, at 124-25.
231 See PAUL TILLICH, DYNAMICS OF FAITH 1-2 (1957).
232 See Smith, supra note 130, at 506.
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C. Religious Learning and the Natural Sciences: A Limited Application
The natural sciences require a different analysis. In large measure,
this is because the two modes of religious learning have a limited appli-
cation to the teaching of science. The core incongruity lies in the fact
that science, unlike literature and history, purports to tell students what
is (or what is generally thought to be) true about the physical and natu-
ral world, whereas the modes of religious learning do not aim at provid-
ing "true" answers. 233 Instead, the modes expose students to the in-
sights, or voices, of religious traditions with an eye toward civic and
moral development. 234 Moreover, the basic purpose of religious learn-
ing is to enable students to explore the relevance of religious belief to
other parts of their education. But understanding science (like under-
standing mathematics) does not depend upon religious insight to the
same degree as history, literature, music, and art. 235
It is true that some people resist the widely accepted position that
science accurately represents what we now believe to be true about the
physical and natural world. To this very limited extent, the external
mode is relevant: considering and discussing why significant numbers
of people believe this, 236 even if one thinks that they are wrong to be-
lieve it, promotes some of the purposes underlying the external mode:
the ability to understand people whose views are radically different
than one's own and to see how their religious beliefs enable them to
make sense of the world. But the science course itself is not the place
for these considerations.
Perhaps the most contentious Establishment Clause issue with re-
spect to religious learning in public schools involves the teaching of
evolution. 237 Efforts to introduce "creation science" or "Intelligent De-
233 See supra notes 87-94 and accompanying text.
234 Obviously particular religious traditions, just like most science curricula, make
truth claims about the physical and natural world. But the purpose of religious learning,
and conversational learning generally, is not and cannot be to inculcate the truthof any of
these views.
235 In large part, this is because the development of civic and moral understandings is
much less central to the scientific enterprise than to the religious and humanistic. Science
is, in this respect, a more limited field. See GREENAWALT, supra note 21, at 145 ("In contrast
to natural science, no science of morality establishes what are correct and incorrect moral
conclusions.").
•236 See NORD & HAYNES, supra note 2, at 139 ("Roughly a third of Americans believe
that the Bible is inerrant and would presumably adopt the view (if asked) that religion
trumps science.").
237 GREENAWALT, supra note 21, at 88; see also supra note 6.
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sign"238 into the science curriculum are ill conceived for at least two
reasons. First, science, including the many important insights of neo-
Darwinian synthesis239 (e.g., recent advances in genetics, comparative
anatomy, species distribution, embryology, astronomical physics, and
the use of radioactive isotopes for determining age) have proven ex-
tremely valuable as tools for explaining and understanding innumer-
able phenomena in the world.24° Like arithmetic, scientific methodo-
logical naturalism and the theories that it has produced (including
evolution) constitute an essential fund of knowledge that every student
must study in order merely to attain the most rudimentary procedural
skills of the educational conversation-e.g., the capacity to understand
why an argument that proceeds from certain commonly shared prem-
ises is highly likely to be sound. The very notion that "science" should
be a distinct and required subject of study presupposes that topics such
as evolution must take center stage, just as no one would doubt that
addition and subtraction must be taught in mathematics classes. That
is, even if one were inclined to take seriously the comparatively modest
argument 241 of some Intelligent Design theorists that scientific evidence
cannot completely explain the origins of the human species or the uni-
verse-that there are "gaps" in the account-one must notice how
much this claim already concedes. It implies that evolutionary theory
(for example) provides highly persuasive, empirically testable explana-
tions for a significant number of crucial conclusions about the origins
of life.242
238 See generally Kitzmiller v. Dover Area Sch. Dist., 400 F. Supp. 2d 707 (M.D. Pa. 2005)
(holding that teaching Intelligent Design in high school biology class violated the Estab-
lishment Clause).
239 See PHILIP KITCHER, AiUSING SCIENCE: THE CASE AGAINST CREATIONISM 17 (1982).
240 SeeJay D. Wexler, Darwin, Design, and Disestablishment: Teaching the Evolution Contro-
versy in Public Schools, 56 VAND. L. REv. 751, 804-05 (2003) ('[A]lthough the scientific
community might disagree on some of the details, it overwhelmingly agrees that the basic
theory of evolution is correct and indeed that it is the central and unifying concept in all
of biology." (footnotes omitted)); Editorial, The Crafty Attacks on Evolution, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
23, 2005, at 16 (quoting the statement of the National Academy of Sciences that evolution
is "one of the strongest and most useful scientific theories we have," and that it is sup-
ported overwhelmingly within the scientific community).
241 1 put to the side arguments for teaching Intelligent Design (or creationism) as the
alternative to evolution, as these are patently unconstitutional. See GREENAWALT, supra note
21, at 124.
242 See id. at 108 ("If an intelligent-design theorist is careful not to deny that the domi-
nant account with all its features explains a great deal about life's development, he can
render his own approach consistent with the empirical evidence, which itself cannot rule
out a possible role, however minor, for creative intelligence that transcends ordinary scien-
tific principles at various stages of the process."). In a similar vein, see Peter Slevin, Battle
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Second, the claims of Intelligent Design are not generally believed
to be scientific; 243 they are arguments about the limits of science.244 The
negative claim that evolutionary theory cannot explain completely the
way that particular species or organisms have developed (and is
unlikely to provide complete explanations in the future) may in theory
be advanced with empirical evidence, but even then one may won-
der whether it is within science's domain to be certain that science ei-
ther can or cannot explain every natural phenomenon. 245 Intelligent
Design theories that do not rely on such empirical evidence, however,
are immune from observation and falsification, which in turn severely
impairs the legitimacy of their claims to a place in the "science" class. 246
on Teaching Evolution Sharpens, WASH. POST, Mar. 14, 2005, at A01 (reporting the comment
of Professor William Harris of the University of Missouri at Kansas Medical School that
"[o]ur goal is not to remove evolution. Good lord, it's incredible how much this is misun-
derstood.... Kids need to understand it, but they need to know the strengths and weak-
nesses of the data, how much of it is a guess, how much of it is extrapolation."). It should
be noted that Professor Harris does not advocate teaching Intelligent Design. See id.
243 See Wexler, supra note 240, at 805-07 ("The same [scientific] community holds a
near-complete consensus that intelligent design is not good science and therefore an un-
important theory in the field. Perhaps the most salient fact regarding this last consensus is
that articles advocating intelligent design theory in peer-reviewed scientific journals ap-
pear to be nonexistent." (footnotes omitted)).
2 See GREENAWALT, supra note 21, at 110; GREENAWALT, supra note 2, at 147-48.
Greenawalt helpfully distinguishes between "intrinsic" limits of science- "basic limits that
are set by the domains of scientific endeavors" -and "contingent" limits- "limits on what
science is able to explain, within the domains that scientific inquiry covers." Id. at 148. He
argues that it may be appropriate for science teachers to acquaint students with contingent
limits of methodological naturalism, but that the appropriateness of doing so will depend
on the plausibility (as gauged by a kind of scholarly consensus) of the specific contingent
limit. Id. at 149.
Though this Article argues in principle for a cleaner separation in which most "con-
tingent" (as well as "intrinsic") limits would be discussed outside the science class but in
another curricular context, it is not clear that this distinction will amount to much of a
practical difference, as Greenawalt's "plausibility" screen might well rule out the appropri-
ateness of introducing many "contingent" limits in the science curriculum.
245 See GREENAWALT, supra note 21, at 110. But cf. Thomas Nagel, Public Education and
Intelligent Design, 36 PHIL. & PuB. AF. 187, 192 (2008) (characterizing as a "scientific
claim" Michael Behe's argument that "random mutation is not sufficient to explain the
range of variation on which natural selection must have acted to yield the history of life:
some of the variation was not due to chance").
246 1 agree with Greenawalt that, in principle, "[a] particular theory that science 'runs
out' in some respect in explaining events can be subject to observation and falsification" -
for example, a methodologically scientific investigation of a claimed miracle that con-
cludes that the miracle cannot be explained naturally. See GREENAWALT, supra note 21, at
110. Yet even the most sophisticated Intelligent Design objections to science curricula are
not falsifiable in the way that methodological scientific theories are (a point with which
Greenawalt, I believe, agrees). See id.; Chris Mooney & Matthew C. Nisbet, Undoing Darwin,
COLUM.JOURNALISM REv., Sept./Oct. 2005, at 30, 33 (reporting the belief of biologist Mi-
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Nevertheless, the fact that the questions with which Intelligent
Design, like many other philosophically and religiously grounded be-
liefs, is concerned (e.g., what is the nature and origin of the universe
and humanity?) should not be pursued in the natural science curricu-
lum does not mean that they should be ignored by public schools.2 47
To the contrary, the overtly religious cast of Intelligent Design and
creationist claims ought to be acknowledged, reflected upon, and dis-
cussed, along with other belief systems, within the conversation of
civic and moral education in an appropriate classroom context. Such
an approach may enhance students' perspectives, both with respect to
the limits of science's subject matter and the spiritual questions for
which science may not provide answers. These kinds of discussions
could occur, for example, in a history course, a high school ethics
course, or a comparative religion course.2 4s
The advantages of pursuing these topics outside the science class
are manifest. The idea of creation or a creator is not a universal feature
of all faiths.249 "Some Hindu texts tell of vast cycles of creation," while
others, such as Buddhism, are agnostic about it.25 ° Moreover, the exter-
nal and internal modes are not properly accounted for unless religious
beliefs about life's origins are presented within an adequate historical
and cultural context: "Teaching intelligent design, without talking
about history, culture, politics, and especially religion, will not help
students understand what the controversy over evolution is really about
chael Behe that "certain biochemical structures are 'irreducibly complex'" and that such
complexity alone constitutes a challenge to evolutionary theory); Slevin, supra note 242
(reporting the statement of Stephen C. Meyer of the Discovery Institute that "[w]hat we
would like to foment is a civil discussion about science. That falls right down the middle of
the fairway of American pluralism").
247 Mark Lilla has questioned why I seem to draw a Maginot Line around natural sci-
ence and points out that the history of modern science might be fruitfully explored in the
light of theology, ancient cosmology, and the like. E-mail from Mark Lilla, Professor of the
Humanities, Columbia University, to Marc 0. DeGirolami [author] (Nov. 4, 2007) (on file
with author). Lilla is certainly correct to note the value of religious learning for the history
of science. But these questions are better pursued in other subject areas-a history course,
for example, as Professor Lilla's comment itself suggests-in order to give them a more
thorough, and a fairer and more representative, treatment.
248 See GREENAWALT, supra note 21, at 119; NORD & HAYNES, supra note 2, at 186 ("We
also believe, however, that the curriculum should include room for a moral capstone
course that high school seniors might take, in which they learn about the most important
moral frameworks of thought-secular and religious, historical and contemporary-and
how such frameworks might shape their thinking about the most urgent moral controver-
sies they face.").
249 See NORD & HAYNES, supra note 2, at 146.
250 See id.
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or help them discuss issues that range over the spectrum of human
concerns."251
From this, it should be clear that the science class is not the forum
for discussing the limitations of science in considering the kinds of
questions that inform civic and moral learning. In fact, religious learn-
ing is far better promoted if such discussions do not intrude on the
precious few hours to communicate the basics of evolutionary theory.
Both the external and internal modes contemplate cultural and his-
torical instruction about the claims of religion within the conversation
of civic and moral education, but in a context where such learning does
not compete for time and preeminence with the natural science cur-
riculum.252
IV. DIFFICULTIES POSED BY THE MODAL THEORY OF RELIGIOUS
LEARNING
This Part explores three objections to religious learning, as in-
formed by the two modes. 253 As with the prior application of the the-
ory to a selection of curricular matters, the treatment of difficulties is
not exhaustive. 254 Nevertheless, the objections discussed are some of
the most challenging, both from a constitutional and a more general
perspective, for the educational model offered here. 255
A. Teacher Competence, Curricular Incorporation, and Demandingness
Perhaps the most obvious objection to the religious learning
model is that teachers are simply not qualified to teach about religious
traditions and beliefs, let alone to conduct a class incorporating reli-
gious themes, with the requisite delicacy demanded by the two
modes. 256 Likewise, teachers come to the classroom with their own be-
liefs and opinions about religion, and it is therefore unlikely that they
can offer religious instruction in an appropriately balanced way.257 A
somewhat related objection is that there is no room in the curriculum
(or inadequate resources or time) for incorporating religious learn-
25l Wexler, supra note 240, at 808.
252 See supra notes 233-251 and accompanying text.
253 See infta notes 256-314 and accompanying text.
24 See supra notes 200-252 and accompanying text.
255 See infra notes 256-314 and accompanying text.
256 See GREENAWALT, supra note 21, at 27.
2-57 See NORD & HAYNES, supra note 2, at 55.
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ing.258 Even if teachers were well trained and otherwise inclined, the
demands of the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001259 are too onerous to
focus on anything other than teaching basic skills like reading and
mathematics. 260
The problem of adequate time and resources is considerable. 26'
Public schools are under enormous strain to meet demanding national
standards and must often devote substantial, if not exclusive, attention
to reading and mathematics in order to survive within the current
framework.2 62 One might argue, however, that if No Child Left Be-
hind's reading and mathematics standards are so high that they effec-
tively preclude the teaching of any other subject, then a readjustment
of educational priorities is in order. The ability to read and add indis-
putably are crucial components of every educational program, but pro-
ficiency in reading requires more than an ability to understand the lit-
eral meaning of an assortment of sequential sentences. 263 It is a central
claim of this Article that reading comprehension, essay writing, oral
expression, and the like presuppose the development of certain educa-
tional habits of thought that are necessarily wedded to the substance of
past traditions of understanding and meaning.264 Introducing religious
learning is therefore not necessarily a matter of "adding" to the reading
curriculum. 265 Instead, it may involve consciously using texts that impli-
cate religious concerns and teaching about those concerns within the
context of learning how to read deeply-that is, the "natural inclusion"
of religion within the existing curriculum.2 66
258 See Sam Dillon, Schools Cut Back Subjects to Push Reading and Math, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
26, 2006, at Al.
259 Pub. L. No. 107-10, 115 Stat. 1425 (2002) (codified as amended in scattered sec-
tions of 20 U.S.C.).
260 See Dillon, supra note 258 ("Thousands of schools across the nation are responding
to the reading and math testing requirements laid out in No Child Left Behind, President
Bush's signature education law, by reducing class time spent on other subjects and, for
some low-proficiency students, eliminating it.").
261 See id.
262 See id. The evidence that even then, they frequently cannot meet the standards is
overwhelming, as one recent news article demonstrates. See Diana Jean Schemo, Failing
Schools Strain to Meet U.S. Standard, N.Y. TiMEs, Oct. 16, 2007, at Al.
263 See Eisgruber, supra note 84, at 72.
264 See supra notes 200-252 and accompanying text.
266 See NORD & HAYNES, supra note 2, at 89.
266 See id. at 46, 89. Professor Nord admits that "there is a very important ambiguity in
the term 'natural inclusion.' Natural to whom?" See NORD, supra note 2, at 209. This raises
two important points. First, not all of literature, history, and art implicates religious con-
cerns, and some works do so only obliquely. In these cases, religion is less "naturally" in-
cluded than it may be in other cases, so that some deliberate effort must be made to study
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The concerns about teacher competence and religious preference
are also significant.267 On the issue of training, one might claim that
teachers of a religious history, comparative religion, or upper-level eth-
ics class should be certified by the state, just as teachers are for history,
science, mathematics, and all other major disciplines. 268 Certification in
subjects such as history, the arts, and English or reading could be re-
fashioned to include religious learning as it might apply to particular
disciplines. 269 The state-mandated character of certification would cer-
tainly have the effect of standardizing the content of what could be
constitutionally taught about religion both in a freestanding religious
studies or ethics class and within other disciplines.270 Standardization
would also offer guidance to teachers who will doubtless bring a variety
of perspectives about religion to the classroom.
A danger in standardization is that it could be used improperly to
compel teachers to incorporate religious learning into their disciplines
uniformly.27 1 Teachers- "[t] he only indispensable equipment of
'School'"-must be given considerable latitude to develop a curricu-
lum that incorporates religious learning after an individual fashion that
will allow them best to fulfill their key role in initiating their students
into the world of civic and moral understanding. 272 Perhaps districts
could supplement a rudimentary certification requirement with a suite
topics with religious connections. Second, this Article has attempted to demonstrate how
pervasive the reach of religion can be for enlarging one's civic and moral sensibilities; to
this extent, religion may often be "naturally" includable.
267 See GREENAWALT, supra note 21, at 27; NORD & HAYNES, supra note 2, at 55.
268 See NORD & HAYNES, supra note 2, at 45, 56.
269 See Wexler, supra note 3, at 1235-36 ("[E]ven though schools should add religious
themes and ideas to existing social studies classes so that students can learn about the role
that religion has played in human history, the goals outlined above probably can not be
attained through simply adding religious content to classes that already exist. Instead,
separate classes in religious topics will have to be added to the curriculum so that students
can gain an in-depth understanding of religion.").
270 NORD & HAYNES, supra note 2, at 56 ("All teachers who deal with religiously con-
tested matters should know something about the relationship of religion to their particular
subjects and disciplines. Ideally, they should be required, as part of their certification, to
take at least one course relating religion to their subject .... Whether required or not,
departments of religious studies should make such courses available as electives.").
271 On the difficulties of assessing the legality, let alone the propriety, of state teacher
certification standards, see generally Gulino v. N.Y State Educ. Dep't, 460 F.3d 361 (2d Cir.
2006).
272 See OAKESHOTr, Engagement and Frustration, supra note 88, at 69-70. I mean "fash-
ion" in the same sense that Oakeshott uses the word "style" to express something of the
judgment that teachers bring to the task of imparting information. See OAKESHOT]r, Learn-
ing and Teaching, supra note 89, at 61. For greater elaboration of this important aspect of
Oakeshott's work, see SULLIVAN, supra note 87, at 75.
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of additional courses in religion that may be of particular relevance to
the student population or community, thus giving teachers greater
choice in developing their specific religious learning curricula. Still, in
order to satisfy the aims of religious learning as a conversation, minor-
ity and majority religious perspectives should be taught in all schools. 273
Some teachers may still object, conceivably even on free exercise
grounds, to incorporating religious learning into their classrooms in
any form because they are simply uncomfortable with the educational
model presented here.2 74 These reservations are understandable but, in
the main, they are indistinguishable from any number of curricular
objections teachers may have. 275 Though teachers require the freedom
to shape their curricula, that freedom must be balanced against the
possibility that some teachers who find religion an awkward topic would
exclude religious learning altogether from disciplines to which it has
made contributions. 2 76
I am also sensitive to the criticism that the model of education ad-
vocated in this Article is too demanding given the dire condition of
contemporary American public schooling.277 To expect so much of an
institution that is struggling merely to keep children in school and out
of the criminal justice system and to provide them with the barest liter-
acy and numeracy is, some might object, unrealistic. 2 78 Like the preced-
ing criticisms, this one has obvious bite. This Article suggests ways in
which religious learning can be incorporated without adding dramati-
273 See NORD & HAYNES, supra note 2, at 48.
274 There is an interesting analogy, implicating both Establishment and Free Exercise
Clause concerns, to cases where a religious school has complained that state certification
requirements interfere with its religious liberty and that of its students. See, e.g., New Life
Baptist Church v. Town of E. Longmeadow, 885 F.2d 940, 952, 954 (1st Cir. 1989) (reject-
ing both types of challenges); Fellowship Baptist Church v. Benton, 815 F.2d 485, 494-95,
498 (8th Cir. 1987) (rejecting both types of challenges and holding that "nothing in the
certification statute or regulations requires agreement or acceptance of the beliefs and
values of others").
275 For some teachers, a conversational approach toward religious learning may prove
repugnant and essentially incompatible with their own religious or anti-religious beliefs.
For example, some teachers may feel that all religion is an unalloyed evil, or that the only
true religion is their own and all others are impostors, and they may insist on expressing
these views to their students in class. If one is committed to the value of religious learning
for civic and moral education, teachers with these types of views about religion should not
teach disciplines in which religious ideas and perspectives are relevant (and they should
not teach a comparative religion course).
276 See supra notes 274-275 and accompanying text.
277 See Dillon, supra note 258.
278 See id.
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cally to the burden already imposed on public schools. 279 But there
should be no illusions about the ambitiousness of the model of liberal
learning presented in this Article. Oakeshott usefully compared the
difficulty of developing fluency in the conversation of education to the
challenge of learning a foreign language. 28° It will require time, re-
sources, good will, a "discipline of inclination" and perseverance, 281 and
more than a few trials and errors to achieve. Any theory that engages
with the problem of religious learning within liberal public education
and takes its challenges seriously will face practical obstacles such as
these. And yet the practical difficulties, substantial as they may be, do
not diminish the power of the theory as an educational aspiration.
B. Age-Appropriate Instruction
A different objection that implicates Establishment Clause con-
cerns is the age at which religious learning becomes appropriate.28 2 In
the elementary grades, students are especially impressionable and sen-
sitive to the authority of teachers and their parents. To introduce reli-
gious learning is inadvisable for very young children because they have
not yet developed sufficiently the cognitive skills to engage in conversa-
tional learning. 283 Parents' beliefs are extremely important in these
years. Similarly, the objection continues, older students are subject to
powerful pressures to conform, so that introducing religious learning
along the lines suggested by the two modes may create special prob-
lems for their relationships with parents and friends. This objection is
directly reflected in the Supreme Court's observations in its Establish-
ment Clause jurisprudence about the impressionability of children and
its consequent concern to provide them special constitutional protec-
tion .284
279 See supra notes 262-266 and accompanying text (arguing that religious learning
should be accomplished by "natural inclusion" of the topic).
280 See OAKESHOTV, Understanding Human Conduct, supra note 108, at 65; Andrew Davis
& Kevin Williams, Epistemology and Curriculum, in THE BLACKWELL GUIDE TO THE PHILOSO-
PHY OF EDUCATION, supra note 121, at 253, 266-67.
281 OAKESHOTr, Engagement and Frustration, supra note 88, at 68-69.
282 SeeNORD & HAYNES, supra note 2, at 177.
283 See id.
284 See, e.g., Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 311-12 (2000) (comment-
ing on the "immense social pressure" experienced by adolescents); Lee v. Weisman, 505
U.S. 577, 593 (1992) (commenting on high school students' impressionability in the con-
text of graduation prayer); Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 583-84 (1987) (noting that
"[t]he Court has been particularly vigilant in monitoring compliance with the Establish-
ment Clause in elementary and secondary schools"); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 274
n.14 (1981) (observing that university students are "less impressionable" than younger
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For young students in the elementary grades, this objection is per-
suasive. Kindergarteners are not intellectually ready for religious learn-
ing, let alone for internal conversational reflection about the relevance
of religious beliefs to their own lives. 2a5 For these students, the most
common contact with religion in school may occur when a Christmas
tree or menorah appears in class sometime in December. Religious
symbols celebrating the holidays present an especially thorny problem.
The appearance together in a public school classroom or hallway of
symbols as different as a crche, a Christmas tree, a menorah, and a
large plastic Santa Claus, with no explanation and unconnected to any
educational aim, is extremely likely to render religion opaque and mys-
tifying, as inquisitive youngsters are deliberately given no information
to make sense of the symbols. These effects are exacerbated when par-
ticular symbols are added or removed on the basis of threats of legal
action or other community displeasure. Most importantly, the de facto
exclusion of non-Christian or non-Jewish holiday symbols creates not
only the potential for resentment among children who adhere to other
traditions but also the unwarranted sense in Christian and Jewish stu-
dents that their traditions are the most important.286
Because the aim of religious learning as guided by the two modes
is solely educational, and not to celebrate certain religious traditions
(even those whose symbols-e.g., the Christmas tree, Santa Claus,
Easter eggs, etc.-are imbued with culturally ambiguous dimensions),
if schools introduce these symbols, they should do so only in the con-
text of an educational activity and with a concerted effort to present a
healthy variety of them. 28 7 Such limited exposure might be consistent
students); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 686 (1971) (holding that university students
are "less impressionable and less susceptible to religious indoctrination" than younger
students).
285 See NORD & HAYNES, supra note 2, at 177.
286 Justice O'Connor's "endorsement" Establishment Clause test has become the Su-
preme Court's favored standard for assessing the constitutionality of religious displays on
government property. See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 592-94 (1989) (cit-
ing Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 691 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring)). Under that
test, the government acts impermissibly in its religious displays when it "sends a message to
nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the political community, and an
accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders, favored members of the politi-
cal community." Lynch, 465 U.S. at 688 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Note that the en-
dorsement approach does not account for the special educational concerns that attend
religious displays in public schools. See id.
287 Professor Noah Feldman has advocated a constitutional approach that would give
greater latitude to symbolic religious displays by the government than the present Su-
preme Court practice allows. See, e.g., County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 589-94. It is unclear,
however, how he feels about religious displays in public schools. See NOAH FELDMAN, Di-
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with the external mode of religious learning if undertaken to initiate
youngsters into an educational conversation with one another. Still,
because very young students have limited capacities for understand-
ing complex concepts and historical explanations, even this approach
is perhaps better suited to students in later primary grades. 288
Religious learning in both modes becomes more appropriate as
students grow older. Although more in-depth study in a comparative
religion or ethics course should be reserved for upper-level students,
religious topics and themes may be gradually introduced and their civic
and moral relevance explored.289 Older students will as a general mat-
ter be better prepared for the conversational model of civic and moral
education and the contributions of religious learning to it.29° As stu-
dents' powers of critical reasoning and reflection develop and become
more independent, teaching about religion's civic and moral insights
and failings becomes more appropriate. 291 Peer pressure to conform
can of course be powerful in these years,292 but the external and inter-
nal modes of religious learning can help to relieve at least a part of that
pressure by opening civic and moral understandings within the educa-
tional structures of school. Religious learning may serve as an addi-
tional source of civic and moral guidance, or students may find it ir-
relevant or unhelpful to their concerns. 293
VIDED BY GOD: AMERICA'S CHURCH-STATE PROBLEM-AND WHAT WE SHOULD Do ABOUT
IT 15-16 (2005) (arguing that religious displays are permissible "so long as they accom-
modate and honor religious diversity"). In the particular case of religious displays in public
schools, Professor Feldman's approach is not sufficiently sensitive to what should be the
educational impetus behind such displays. See id.288 See NORD & HAYNES, supra note 2, at 177.
289 See Aguillard, 482 U.S. at 608 n.7 (Powell, J., concurring) ("[M]any general teaching
guides suggest that education as to the nature of various religious beliefs could be inte-
grated into a secondary school curriculum in a manner consistent with the Constitu-
tion.").
290 See NORD & HAYNES, supra note 2, at 177.
291 See id.
292 See supra note 284 and accompanying text.
29 Upper-level students should be offered an elective in comparative religion or ethics
to pursue these questions more deeply. Nord and Haynes consider the possibility that a
school would require such a class, remarking that in such a case requests for excusal
should be liberally granted. NORD & HAYNES, supra note 2, at 178. I agree, however, with
Greenawalt and Wexler that the better policy is to give students (and their parents) the
option whether to take a more rigorous course in religious studies and ethics. See
GREENAWALT, supra note 21, at 150, 242 n.53; Wexler, supra note 3, at 1261.
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C. Parental and Student Objections and Exemptions
Objections to religious learning within the conversational model
could come from either religious or nonreligious parents and stu-
dents.2 4 The principal religious objection proceeds along these lines:
"Some deeply religious people object to the idea of teaching religion
objectively in the public schools because such an approach to religion
encourages a dangerous attitude of relativism and devalues religion by
making it seem like choosing a religion is like choosing a product, a
'styl[e] of dress ... .."2 A slightly different but related objection is that
the approach advocated in this Article results in a watery and anemic
version of religion, in which the rich coloring of religious traditions-
especially the chiaroscuro-loses its vibrancy and becomes a kind of
"mush." 6 Indeed, it is a classic anti-establishment argument that strict
separation of church and state is necessary to "preserve" religion in all
of its uniqueness and that government interaction with religion inevi-
tably "corrupts" it.297
24 See infra notes 295-314 and accompanying text.
29 Wexler, supra note 3, at 1258-59 (alteration and omission in original) (footnotes
omitted); see also Nomi Maya Stolzenberg, "He Drew a Circle That Shut Me Out": Assimilation,
Indoctrination, and the Paradox of a Liberal Education, 106 HARV. L. REv. 581, 614 (1993)
("[T]o its opponents, the objective study of religion, and objective approaches to knowl-
edge in general, are quintessentially secular humanist activities.").
26 See Michael W. McConnell, Education Disestablishment: Why Democratic Values are Ill-
Served by Democratic Control of Schooling, in MORAL AND POLITICAL EDUCATION, supra note
84, at 87, 98.
An even more probable scenario is that public schools, under conditions of
pluralism, will attempt to avoid conflict by watering down the curriculum and
avoiding any teaching that might be offensive to any significant group....
This is the educational equivalent of the least-common-denominator religion
that seems to be the result of official establishment. But this result is neither
neutral (mush, too, reflects an ideological perspective that sharp differences
and clear opinions are either dangerous or poindess) nor calculated to pro-
vide a firm basis for democratic citizenship.
Id.
297 See, e.g., Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 711-12 (2002) (SouterJ., dissent-
ing). Justice Souter's argument is illustrative:
[T]o save religion from its own corruption, Madison wrote of the "'experi-
ence ... that ecclesiastical establishments, instead of maintaining the purity
and efficacy of Religion, have had a contrary operation.'" In Madison's time,
the manifestations were "pride and indolence in the Clergy;, ignorance and
servility in the laity[,] in both, superstition, bigotry and persecution"; in the
21st century, the risk is one of "corrosive secularism" to religious schools and
the specific threat is to the primacy of the schools' mission to educate the
children of the faithful according to the unaltered precepts of their faith.
Even "[t] he favored religion may be compromised as political figures reshape
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This latter point may be the most serious challenge of all for reli-
gious learning within the conversational model of education. 298 It is at
bottom a claim that religious learning cannot convey religious experi-
ence, an essential component of the religious life without which only
the most superficial aspects of religion remain.399 There is really no way
around this objection other than to concede its force and observe that
it is fundamentally compatible with this Article's claims. It is of course
true that religious learning is not the same as religious experience. 300
Religious learning will not give students the personal experience of
conversion, the sublime, the ascetic life, enlightened awareness of exis-
tence through the prism of the Four Noble Truths, or the discipline
that is required to practice the five "Ks" of Sikhism. No student will
come away having experienced religious faith, ecstasy, or mysticism be-
cause of religious learning (at least not intentionally). But that is pre-
cisely the point. Religious learning is an educational, not a religious,
model. Its aims are to introduce students to the world of religious un-
derstandings and to illuminate the relationship of religion to their civic
and moral ideals. It does not impart the potent experience of actually
being or believing like a Catholic or a Sikh. It could never do this because
it takes no position on the truth or the reality of Catholic or Sikh be-
liefs,30' and because the ineffable and noetic qualities of Catholic or
Sikh belief cannot be imparted or taught, but must be directly felt or
experienced. 302
the religion's beliefs for their own purposes; it may be reformed as govern-
ment largesse brings government regulation.
Id. (alterations and omissions in original) (citations omitted).
298 See id.
2W See id.
300 "Religious experience" is itself an enormously complex and variegated phenome-
non, but in the context of this objection to religious learning I take it to mean roughly
what William James described as "the feelings, acts, and experiences of individual men ...
so far as they apprehend themselves to stand in relation to whatever they may consider the
divine." JAMES, supra note 161, at 31. The key point is that religious experience reflects a
subjective assessment-an apprehension--of what is true or real about the subject, here
"the divine." See WAYNE PROUDFOOT, RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE 183-84 (1985) ("A religious
experience is an experience that is identified by its subject as religious, and this identifica-
tion must be based, not on the subject matter or content of the experience, but on its no-
etic quality or its significance for the truth of religious beliefs.").
301 This is so for constitutional as well as educational reasons. See supra notes 46-52 and
accompanying text.
302 JAMES, supra note 161, at 380-81. James was the first to describe the noetic quality
of religious experience:
Although so similar to states of feeling, mystical states seem to those who ex-
perience them to be also states of knowledge. They are states of insight into
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One might still object that religious learning without religious ex-
perience is insipid or "mushy"-that it cannot convey what is deeply
meaningful about religion-and that it is therefore best avoided alto-
gether. Similarly, one might claim that to emphasize "conversation"
privileges a verbal, textual, propositional understanding of religion at
the expense of non-verbal manifestations of religious life, and that
whatever approach is chosen must do justice to a broader range of reli-
gious experience.303 Yet this seems too quick and harsh ajudgment. It is
one thing to point out that there is more to a religious life than under-
standing and reflecting upon religious learning's contributions to the
conversation of civic and moral education. It is something else again to
condemn the educational model proposed here because it cannot offer
students the entirety of a religious experience. There are many experi-
ences the intensity and fullness of which cannot be rendered by learn-
ing about them. Romantic and familial love, the bond of friendship,
the exhilaration of an athletic success or a musical performance, the
flush stupor of drunkenness, and the terror of war are only a very few
that come immediately to mind. But no one would seriously suggest
that reading King Lear is pointless because it cannot deliver the first-
hand experience of filial devotion or the conceits of power and old age,
or that studying a piano concerto is worthless because it is not the same
as composing or performing it oneself. Just as with a foreign' language,
conversational engagement in school is only an initial preparation for
what to listen for or expect in order to gain greater mastery. Develop-
ing the linguistic metaphor, what this Article urges is the comparatively
limited project of "translation" of religious beliefs-which are, admit-
tedly, only a part of religious experience-to add richness to the con-
versation of liberal civic and moral ideals.30 4 And though religious
depths of truth unplumbed by the discursive intellect. They are illuminations,
revelations, full of significance and importance, all inarticulate though they
remain; and as a rule they carry with them a curious sense of authority for af-
ter-time.
See id.
'03 Professor Winnifred Sullivan suggested this criticism to me in correspondence. See
E-mail from Winnifred Sullivan, Associate Professor, University at Buffalo Law School, to
Marc 0. DeGirolami [author] (Dec. 10, 2007) (on file with author) ("Becoming a Jew is
partly about eating your grandmother's cooking. Being a member of any religious com-
munity is about experiencing the variety of styles and attitudes present in any religious
community[.] ").
304 The project is "comparatively limited" because it in no way suggests that this exer-
cise in translation comprehends the whole of religious experience. On the extraordinarily
thorny question of "defining religion," see generally JONAThAN Z. SMITH, IMAGINING RE-
LIGION: FROM BABYLON TOJONESTOwN (1982).
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learning might conceivably degenerate into "mush," there is no reason
to suppose that this need be so. This Article suggests, on the contrary,
that students' more thorough educational exploration of religious
learning is likely to deepen and enrich their civic and moral develop-
ment.
More general skepticism about the possibility of "objective" reli-
gious learning 305 or about its inevitably "secular humanist" assumptions
resurrects the multicultural specter hovering about this entire exer-
cise.306 What more can be said, other than to concede that a viewpoint
is being espoused about the nature of liberal education and the role of
religious learning in it? Another perhaps more practical response is
that even though some extraordinarily devout parents might object to
exposing their child to any religion other than their own, it seems at
least possible that many religiously inclined parents would prefer an
inclusivist program to the current, "the-less-said-the-better" approach.30 7
Whatever the force of these responses, there will surely be religious
and anti-religious or religiously skeptical objections to religious learn-
ing within the conversational model. Whether and when exemptions
should be granted is a complex question that implicates the Free Exer-
cise Clause. 308 If a course in comparative religion or ethics is offered as
an elective, the exemption question is avoided on at least this front.3 09
305 See NORD & HAYNES, supra note 2, at 55.
S06 See supra notes 101-104 and accompanying text. It may be worthwhile to recall that
the U.S. Supreme Court rejected the idea that "objective" teaching about religion, assum-
ing that is possible, establishes a "religion of secularism." See Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v.
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 225 (1963).
307 See ROSEMARY C. SALOMONE, VISIONS OF SCHOOLING: CONSCIENCE, COMMUNITY,
AND COMMON EDUCATION 238 (2000) ("Parent dissenters do not necessarily want the cur-
riculum to privilege their views over others but merely to include their perspectives along
with others. In some cases, they merely want the curriculum to reflect an appropriate
range of moral perspectives on nonconsensual issues without falling into the trap of moral
relativism." (footnote omitted)); Wexler, supra note 3, at 1259-60 ("[T]he religious objec-
tion to teaching about religion is adequately countered by the fact that the current cur-
riculum, through its silence on religious matters, is widely viewed by many-including
conservative Christians-as hostile to religion. Teaching about religion, in other words,
despite its inherently secular qualities, is viewed by many as a remedy for the current mar-
ginalization of religion in public life and is, on balance, highly supportive of religious ways
of life." (footnote omitted)). But see GREENAWALT, supra note 21, at 174 ("Religious objec-
tions to curriculums will almost certainly increase if schools deal more fully with religion;
some parents will not want their children educated about other religions.").
308 See GREENAWALT, supra note 21, at 174-87; NORD, supra note 2, at 247-49; NORD &
HAYNES, supra note 2, at 178.
309 In an interesting variation on the exemption question in this context, Quebec's
Education Department has instituted a requirement that all schools within the province,
public and private, have a required course in "Ethics and Religious Culture" that would
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As for the remainder of the curriculum, the approach taken by the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in 1987 in Mozert v. Hawkins
County Board of Education seems fundamentally sound: exemptions are
in principle unwarranted merely for exposure to ideas with which one
disagrees. 310 Concurring in Mozert, Judge Danny Boggs concluded that
school boards' authority to set curricula is bounded only by the Estab-
lishment Clause, and under this rule exemptions from courses that in-
corporated religious learning would never be required by the Free Ex-
ercise Clause.31'
Nevertheless, there are other reasons that counsel against forcing
religious learning on unwilling parents and students. Threats of com-
pulsion are often met with threatened or actual lawsuits and general
community consternation, which will surely dampen efforts to achieve
the model of liberal education discussed here.3 12 But because part of
the value of the external and internal modes of religious learning
consists in explaining religion's relevance within particular disci-
plines, it would be extremely impractical to excuse students from, say,
certain history classes because they objected to particular conversa-
tions or kinds of instruction that are an integral part of learning
about a given historical era or event.31 3 Perhaps a compromise could
be reached in cases of adamant resistance by reserving the end of a
class for teaching about the relevance of religion for a particular sub-
ject and excusing the objecting students at that point.3 1 4
begin in first grade. See Graeme Hamilton, Losing Faith in Quebec: Even Private Schools in La
Belle Province Must Adopt One-Size-Fits-All Religious Classes, NAT'L POST, Nov. 3, 2007, at Al.
The course will cover Christianity, Judaism, aboriginal spirituality, Islam, Hinduism, and
Buddhism. Id. It was reported somewhat tendentiously that the course is a reform that "has
been sold as an effort to bring the education system more in line with an increasingly secu-
lar Quebec." Id. Recently, two private religious schools have sought an exemption from the
requirement, claiming that their students are already "strongly formed" in the values
taught in the new course. See Brenda Branswell, Parochial Schools Reject New Mandatory Ethics
Course, MONTREAL GAZETrE, May 9, 2008, at A7. Both of these stories were collected by the
invaluable Religion Clause Blog run by Professor Howard M. Friedman. See Postings of
Howard Friedman to Religion Clause Blog, http://religionclause.blogspot.com/ (May 9,
2008, 6:30 AM & Nov. 4, 2007, 12:01 PM).
310 See 827 F.2d 1058, 1063 (6th Cir. 1987); see also Parker v. Hurley, 514 F.3d 87, 105-06
(1st Cir. 2008) (holding that "the mere fact that a child is exposed on occasion in public
school to a concept offensive to the parent's [or the child's] religious beliefs" does not
violate either's religious liberty); Brown v. Hot, Sexy & Safer Prods., Inc., 68 F.3d 525, 533
(1st Cir. 1995) (holding that parents do not have the constitutional right "to dictate the
curriculum at the public school to which they have chosen to send their children").
311 Mozert, 827 F.2d at 1078-81 (Boggs, J., concurring).
312 See Wexler, supra note 3, at 1261-62.
313 See NORD & HAYNES, supra note 2, at 23.
314 See supra notes 312-313 and accompanying text.
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CONCLUSION
It is perplexing that at a time when public schools seem most vul-
nerable, more is being asked of them than perhaps ever before. Ideo-
logical, socioeconomic, pedagogical, and political stresses-or, in Judge
Michael McConnell's apt summary, "the fact of cultural and religious
pluralism, the principle of liberalism, and the ineffectiveness of public
education"--constantly threaten their viability.3 15 Public education is
such bitterly contested terrain and fraught with so many immense chal-
lenges that the temptation simply to give up the ghost cannot easily be
denied. And yet, in the face of these obstacles, ever more elaborate
demands are made of it.316 The No Child Left Behind Act, which has
been called "the most ambitious federal education statute in dec-
ades," 17 requires states to set challenging intellectual standards of
merit against which students are regularly tested.318 Respected scholars
continue to press the case for full-bodied civic and moral cultivation, a
case made all the more urgent by "the fact of religious and cultural plu-
ralism" itself.319 And, perhaps most telling of all, "comprehensive" ap-
proaches to public education-in which a broad range of out-of-school
educational services are combined with curricular programs and activi-
ties-are vigorously advocated as especially necessary to combat the
adverse educational effects of poverty and to reduce socioeconomic
achievement gaps.3 20 All of these policies and proposals presuppose an
extraordinary degree of involvement in students' civic and moral up-
bringing and development that is all too often insufficiently acknowl-
edged.3 21
The Supreme Court has perennially reaffirmed, as recently as
2007, that the core obligation of public schools is "to teach that our
strength comes from people of different races, creeds, and cultures
315 See McConnell, supra note 296, at 96.
316 SeeJames E. Ryan, The Perverse Incentives of the No Child Left Behind Act, 79 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 932, 932-33 (2004).
317 Chester E. Finn,Jr. & Frederick M. Hess, On Leaving No Child Behind, PUB. INT., Fall
2004, at 35.
318 SeeRyan, supra note 316, at 933.
319 See McConnell, supra note 296, at 96; see also MACEDO, supra note 22, at 279 (argu-
ing that schools should actively "pursue our deepest civic purposes openly" by cultivating a
robust civic and moral education); Amy Gutmann, Civic Minimalism, Cosmopolitanism, and
Patriotism: Where Does Democratic Education Stand in Relation to Each ?, in MORAL AND POLITI-
CAL EDUCATION, supra note 84, at 23, 26.
320 Michael A. Rebell, Poverty, "Meaningful" Educational Opportunity, and the Necessary
Role of the Courts, 85 N.C. L. REv. 1467, 1476 (2007).
321 See id. at 1515-19 (listing examples of "promising school/community collabora-
tions" in providing "comprehensive" educational services).
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uniting in commitment to the freedom of all."3 22 That theme has been
a cornerstone of the Supreme Court's jurisprudence of public educa-
tion, and it has intimated that teaching about religion can promote
that theme constitutionally.32 3 Yet in order to reconcile its sweeping
and lofty statements about the virtues of civic and moral education
with its Establishment Clause jurisprudence, the Supreme Court must
confront the problem of religious learning-the problem that reli-
gious learning must be, but cannot be, separated from public educa-
tion-more rigorously and sensitively than is possible within its cur-
rent dichotomous methodology. That binary approach-promotion
or non-promotion3 24; the "secular" or the "sectarian"325-is conceptu-
ally inadequate to account for the broad and often subtle effect that
religious learning has on the cultivation of civic and moral ideals. The
most controversial Establishment Clause policy battles involving pub-
lic schools today, such as those over evolution and Intelligent Design,
demand a more complex constitutional framework of assessment in
light of the deeply problematic questions that they raise.
Even as it is assailed, the idea of a public school still retains the
power to inspire and excite as a cultural aspiration-a vision of what we
wish and hope to be. But to meet its challenges and to realize its possi-
bilities, public education needs grounding in a theory of liberal learn-
ing that can support its civic and moral commitments. It has been this
Article's aim to identify and elaborate just such a model of liberal learn-
ing, within which civic, moral, and religious learning have an inte-
grated place in the development of an individual sensibility or layered
personality. Liberal learning, on this model, aspires to be "free" from
the narrow partialities of community and the appetites of the world sub
specie voluntatis.3 26 It makes available to students what does not "lie upon
the surface of [their] present world," but it is also liberal in the sense
that one is always at liberty to accept or reject its offerings.3 27 Civic and
322 See Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S.Ct. 2738, 2788
(2007) (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy did not write the plurality opinion for
the Court (it was written by ChiefJustice Roberts), but his concurrence in part and in the
judgment was crucial for the outcome. See id.
33 See supra notes 74-82 and accompanying text.
324 See, e.g., Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 225 (1963).
325 See, e.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1972); Bd. of Educ. v. Allen, 392
U.S. 236, 243 (1968).
326 See WILLIAMS, EDUCATION, supra note 87, at 31-32.
327 OAKESHOTr, Learning and Teaching, supra note 89, at 48; Ren6 V. Arcilla, Modernising
Media or Modernist Medium? The Strugglefor Liberal Learning in our Information Age, 36J. PHIL.
EDUC. 457, 463 (2002).
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moral learning, within that liberal structure, is not the ingestion of a
premasticated code that makes it easier to solve problems or pick the
best national policies. "[I]t is agents continuously and colloquially re-
lated to one another in the idiom of a familiar language of moral con-
verse."328 Education in that ongoing conversation is carried on in ex-
ternal and internal modes, in much the way that a foreign language is
learned and only gradually mastered through public and personal dis-
cursive practices. And religious learning is.a sphere of understandings
and meanings whose particular expressions offer insights of widely di-
vergent value for an enriched conversational engagement. To access
these insights is to participate in the external and internal discursive
modes of learning about and contemplating the religious voices that
have come before. Liberal learning, in public schools no less than any-
where else, occurs in the perpetual achievement of tentative, tempo-
rary, and perhaps agnostic beliefs.
328 OAKESHOTr, Understanding Human Conduct, supra note 108, at 64; see also SULLIVAN,
supra note 87, at 105 ("Knowing how to act, how to be an agent, and finally the under-
standing of agency itself, are all components of a culture which can be imparted only
through education.").
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